In the French vision, the central goal of a united and independent Europe can be achieved by combining the unification of Europe under French leadership with the simultaneous but gradual diminution of the American primacy on the continent. But if France is to shape Europe’s future, it must both engage and shackle Germany, while also seeking step-by-step to strip Washington of its political leadership in European affairs. The resulting key policy dilemmas for France are essentially twofold: how to preserve the American security commitment to Europe—which France recognizes is still essential—while steadily reducing the American presence; and how to sustain Franco-German partnership as the combined political-economic engine of European unification while precluding German leadership in Europe.
If France were truly a global power, the resolution of these dilemmas in the pursuit of France’s central goal might not be difficult. None of the other European states, save Germany, are endowed with the same ambition or driven by the same sense of mission. Even Germany could perhaps be seduced into acceptance of French leadership in a united but independent (of America) Europe, but only if it felt that France was in fact a global power and could thus provide Europe with the security that Germany cannot but America does.
Germany, however, knows the real limits of French power. France is much weaker than Germany economically, while its military establishment (as the Gulf War of 1991 showed) is not very competent. It is good enough to squash internal coups in satellite African states, but it can neither protect Europe nor project significant power far from Europe. France is no more and no less than a middle-rank European power. Accordingly, in order to construct Europe, Germany has been willing to propitiate French pride, but in order to keep Europe truly secure, it has not been willing to follow French leadership blindly. It has continued to insist on a central role in European security for America.
That reality, painful for French self-esteem, emerged more clearly after Germany’s reunification. Until then, the Franco-German reconciliation did have the appearance of French political leadership riding comfortably on German economic dynamism. That perception actually suited both parties. It mitigated the traditional European fears of Germany, and it had the effect of fortifying and gratifying French illusions by generating the impression that the construction of Europe was led by France, backed by an economically dynamic West Germany.
Franco-German reconciliation, even with its misconceptions, was nonetheless a positive development for Europe, and its importance cannot be overstated. It has provided the crucial foundation for all of the progress so far achieved in Europe’s difficult process of unification. Thus, it was also fully compatible with American interests and in keeping with the long-standing American commitment to the promotion of transnational cooperation in Europe. A breakdown of Franco-German cooperation would be a fatal setback for Europe and a disaster for America’s position in Europe.
Tacit American support made it possible for France and Germany to push the process of Europe’s unification forward. Germany’s reunification, moreover, increased the incentive for the French to lock Germany into a binding European framework. Thus, on December 6, 1990, the French president and the German chancellor committed themselves to the goal of a federal Europe, and ten days later, the Rome intergovernmental conference on political union issued—British reservations notwithstanding—a clear mandate to the twelve foreign ministers of the European Community to prepare a Draft Treaty on Political Union.
However, Germany’s reunification also dramatically changed the real parameters of European politics. It was simultaneously a geopolitical defeat for Russia and for France. United Germany not only ceased to be a political junior partner of France, but it automatically became the undisputed prime power in Western Europe and even a partial global power, especially through its major financial contributions to the support of the key international institutions.[1] The new reality bred some mutual disenchantment in the Franco-German relationship, for Germany was now able and willing to articulate and openly promote its own vision of a future Europe, still as France’s partner but no longer as its protégé.
For France, the resulting diminished political leverage dictated several policy consequences. France somehow had to regain greater influence within NATO—from which it had largely abstained as a protest against U.S. domination—while also compensating for its relative weakness through greater diplomatic maneuver. Returning to NATO might enable France to influence America more; occasional flirtation with Moscow or London might generate pressure from the outside on America as well as on Germany.
Consequently, as part of its policy of maneuver rather than contestation, France returned to NATO’s command structure. By 1994, France was again a de facto active participant in NATO’s political and military decision making; by late 1995, the French foreign and defense ministers were again regular attendees at alliance sessions. But at a price: once fully inside, they reaffirmed their determination to reform the alliance’s structure in order to make for greater balance between its American leadership and its European participation. They wanted a higher profile and a bigger role for a collective European component. As the French foreign minister, Hervé de Charette, stated in a speech on April 8, 1996, “For France, the basic goal [of the rapprochement] is to assert a European identity within the alliance that is operationally credible and politically visible.”
At the same time, Paris was quite prepared to exploit tactically its traditional links with Russia to constrain America’s European policy and to resuscitate whenever expedient the old Franco-British entente to offset Germany’s growing European primacy. The French foreign minister came close to saying so explicitly in August 1996, when he declared that “if France wants to play an international role, it stands to benefit from the existence of a strong Russia, from helping it to reaffirm itself as a major power,” prompting the Russian foreign minister to reciprocate by stating that “of all the world leaders, the French are the closest to having constructive attitudes in their relations with Russia.”[2]
France’s initially lukewarm support for NATO’s eastward expansion—indeed, a barely suppressed skepticism regarding its desirability—was thus partially a tactic designed to gain leverage in dealing with the United States. Precisely because America and Germany were the chief proponents of NATO expansion, it suited France to play cool, to go along reticently, to voice concern regarding the potential impact of that initiative on Russia, and to act as Europe’s most sensitive interlocutor with Moscow. To some Central Europeans, it appeared that the French even conveyed the impression that they were not averse to a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The Russian card thus not only balanced America and conveyed a none-too-subtle message to Germany, but it also increased the pressure on the United States to consider favorably French proposals for NATO reform.
Ultimately, NATO expansion will require unanimity among the alliance’s sixteen members. Paris knew that its acquiescence was not only vital for that unanimity but that France’s actual support was needed to avoid obstruction from other alliance members. Thus, it made no secret of the French intention to make support for NATO expansion a hostage to America’s eventually satisfying the French determination to alter both the balance of power within the alliance and its fundamental organization.
France was at first similarly tepid in its support for the eastward expansion of the European Union. Here the lead was taken largely by Germany, with American support but without the same degree of U.S. engagement as in the case of NATO expansion. Even though in NATO France tended to argue that the EU’s expansion would provide a more suitable umbrella for the former Communist states, as soon as Germany started pressing for the more rapid enlargement of the EU to include Central Europe, France began to raise technical concerns and also to demand that the EU pay equal attention to Europe’s exposed Mediterranean southern flank. (These differences emerged as early as the November 1994 Franco-German summit.) French emphasis on the latter issue also had the effect of gaining for France the support of NATO’s southern members, thereby maximizing France’s overall bargaining power. But the cost was a widening gap in the respective geopolitical visions of Europe held by France and Germany, a gap only partially narrowed by France’s belated endorsement in the second half of 1996 of Poland’s accession to both NATO and the EU.
That gap was inevitable, given the changing historical context. Ever since the end of World War II, democratic Germany had recognized that Franco-German reconciliation was required to build a European community within the western half of divided Europe. That reconciliation was also central to Germany’s historical rehabilitation. Hence, the acceptance of French leadership was a fair price to pay. At the same time, the continued Soviet threat to a vulnerable West Germany made loyalty to America the essential precondition for survival—and even the French recognized that. But after the Soviet collapse, to build a larger and more united Europe, subordination to France was neither necessary nor propitious. An equal Franco-German partnership, with the reunified Germany in fact now being the stronger partner, was more than a fair deal for Paris; hence, the French would simply have to accept Germany’s preference for a primary security link with its transatlantic ally and protector.
With the end of the Cold War, that link assumed new importance for Germany. In the past, it had sheltered Germany from an external but very proximate threat and was the necessary precondition for the eventual reunification of the country. With the Soviet Union gone and Germany reunified, the link to America now provided the umbrella under which Germany could more openly assume a leadership role in Central Europe without simultaneously threatening its neighbors. The
