in an extensionalist mode.

In De corpore I, ii, 7, Hobbes states that “homo quemlibet e multis hominibus, phliosophus quemlibet et multis philosophis denotat propter omnium similitudinem.” Denotation then once more concerns any and every individual who is part of a multitude of single individuals, insofar as homo and philosophus are concrete names of a class. In De corpore I, ii, 7, he adds that words are useful for syllogistic proofs, because, thanks to them, “unumquodque universale singularium rerum conceptus denotat infinitarum.” Words denote concepts, but only of singular things. Mill translates this attitude along clearly extensional lines: “a general name … is capable of being truly affirmed of each of an indefinite number of things” (II, iii).
Finally, in De corpore II, ii, 2, Hobbes writes that the Latin name parabola may denote an allegory (parable) or a geometrical figure (parabola). It is not clear whether denotat here means significat or nominat.

To sum up:

(i) Hobbes uses denotat at least three times in such a way as to encourage an extensional interpretation, in contexts that recall Ockham’s use of significare and supponere.
(ii) Although Hobbes does not use denotare as a technical term, he nonetheless uses it with some regularity and in such a way as to preclude its being interpreted as a synonym of significare, as Hungerland and Vick (1981: 153) have persuasively stressed.
(iii) Hobbes probably moved in this direction under the influence of the ambiguous alternative offered by the passive denotari that he encountered in Ockham, as well as in some logicians belonging to the Nominalist tradition.
(iv) Mill disregards Hobbes’s theory of signification and reads Computation or Logic as if it belonged to a wholly Ockhamistic line of thought.
(v) Mill no doubt decided to oppose “denotation” (instead of nomination) to “connotation” under the influence of Hobbes’s own use of denotare.
The above are of course merely hypotheses. The whole story of the give and take between Ockham and Hobbes and Hobbes and Mill has still to be written.

9.12. Conclusions

In the history of these philosophical terms, issues are clearly at stake which continue to be of considerable relevance from the semiotic and philosophical points of view. Mahoney (1983: 145) remarked on a curious contradiction, or at least a hiatus, between Bacon’s epistemology and his semantics. From a gnoseological point of view, we can know a thing through its species, and we cannot name a thing if we do not know it. When we utter a vox significativa, then, it is because we have something in mind. From a semiotic standpoint, however, the opposite is what happens, or at least something substantially different: we apply the word directly to the thing, without any mediation of the mental image or the concept or the species.

Such is the paradox of any extensional semantics concerned with the relationship between a sentence and its truth conditions. Every extensional semantics, from Bacon to Tarsky, rather than considering the relation between words and meaning, concentrated on the relation between words and something that is the case. An extensional semantics so conceived does not address the problem of how we can know that p is the case. If instead we were to focus on this problem, we would need to be able to identify the mental processes or the semantic structures that make it possible to know or to believe that p is the case. We would need to identify the difference between knowing or believing that p is the case, and the fact that p is the case. But a strict extensional semantics is not concerned with these kinds of epistemological questions, seeing that its exclusive object of study is the formal relation between propositions and what is assumed to be the case. “Snow is white” is true only if snow is white. For an extensional semantics, the marginal and accidental fact that it is hard for us to know on what basis we may assume that snow really is white is not a problem

An intensional semantics on the other hand is invariably concerned with the description of our cognitive structures. It may not be capable of determining whether snow is or is not really white, but it seeks to imagine and reflect upon the mental organization and encyclopedic structures that permit us to assume that snow is white.

Thus, in the last analysis, the history of the alternate fortunes of denotation (and the fact that its status remains moot) turns out to be a symptom of the unending dialectic between a cognitive and a truth-conditional approach.

The original version of this essay was published in English with the title “Denotation” in Eco and Marmo (1989), and subsequently in Italian as an appendix to Eco (1997a). [Translator’s note: This appendix was not included in the English translation of Eco (1997).] I would like to thank Mariateresa Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli, Andrea Tabarroni, Roberto Lambertini, and Costantino Marmo for discussing the content with me and for their valuable suggestions.

1. Here and elsewhere references to the standard edition of the Collected Papers (Peirce 1931–1958) appear under the abbreviation CP.
2. Recently, Lo Piparo (2003) has proposed a different interpretation of the passage in question, according to which the passions of the soul are not mental images of things, but ways of being of thought, cognitive modalities (like reflecting, being afraid, feeling joy). In the same way, the pragmata cannot be things that already exist or facts in general, otherwise how are we to explain why, in other parts of his opus, Aristotle claims that we can think of nonexistent or false things like the chimera, or events that might exist but whose existence it is impossible to demonstrate. See the earlier references to Lo Piparo’s theory in Chapter 4 of this volume, section 4.2.5. Nevertheless, even if we were to accept his reading, I do not think it would alter the nature of the problem under discussion.
3. On Boethius’s use of the term “nota” see our Chapter 4.2.4. For an English translation of this work by Boethius, see Boethius 1988.
4. In the Dialectica (V, II, De definitionibus; De Rijk 1956: 594), it is clear that a nomen is determinativum of all the possible differences of something, and it is by hearing a name pronounced that we are able to understand (intelligere) them all. The sententia includes within itself all these differences, while the definitio posits only certain of them, those, that is, needed to determine the meaning of a name in the context of a proposition, eliminating all ambiguities: “Sic enim plures aliae sint ipsius differentiae constitutivae quae omnes in nomine corporis intelligi dicantur, non totam corporis sententiam haec definitio tenet, sicut enim nec hominis definitio animal rationale et mortale vel animal gressibile bipes. Sicut enim hominis nomen omnium differentiarum suarum determinativum sit, omnes in ipso opportet intelligi; non tamen omnes in definitione ipsius poni convenit propter vitium superfluae locutionis.… Cum autem et bipes et gressibilis et perceptibilis disciplinae ac multae quoque formae fortasse aliae hominis sint differentiae, quae omnes in nomine hominis determinari dicantur … apparet hominis sententiam in definitionem ipsius totam non claudi sed secundum quamdam partem constitutionis suae ipsius definiri. Sufficiunt itaque ad definiendum quae non sufficiunt ad constituendum.”
5. “Unde haec vox, homo est asinus, est vere vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi, ideo dicitur falsa” (I, iii, 31). “Nomina significant aliquid, scilicet quosdam conceptus simplices, licet rerum compositarum …” (I, iii, 34).
6. The preposition per “denotes the instrumental cause” (IV Sent. 1, 1, 4). Elsewhere he affirms that “praedicatio per causam potest … exponi per propositionem denotantem habitudinem causae” (I Sent. 30, 1, 1). Or “dicitur Christus sine additione, ad denotandum quod oleo invisibili unctus est …” (Super Ev. Matthaei 1, 4). In all these and in similar cases the term denotatio is always used in the weaker sense.
7. De Rijk (1962–1967: 206), for example, affirms that in Abelard “a point of view appears to prevail that is not based on logic” and that the term impositio “stands in most cases for prima inventio” and that “rarely is it encountered with the sense of denoting some actual imposition in this or that proposition emitted by some actual speaker. When even the voces are separated from the res, their connection with the intellect leads the author into the realm of psychology, or confines him to that of ontology, since the intellectus in its turn is referred to reality. The theory of predication too appears to be extremely influenced by the prevalence of perspectives that do not belong to logic.” Hence, the medieval logicians “would have obtained better results if they had completely abandoned the very notion of signification” (De Rijk 1982: 173). But we cannot expect the medievals to think in terms of modern truth-functional semantics.
8. In the Vienna commentary on Priscian (see De Rijk [1962–1967]: 245), a name “significat proprie vel appellative vel denotando de qua manerie rerum sit aliquid.” Thus, denotare still appears to be connected with the significance of universal nature.
9. “Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo. Differunt autem suppositio et significatio, quia significatio est per impositionem vocis ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termini iam significantis rem pro aliquo.… Quare significatio prior est suppositione” (Tractatus VI, 3).
10. See Chapter 4 in the present volume.
11. We have in mind the first and more reliable part of the text, dedicated to the true Scotus and not to Thomas of Erfurt.
12. Concerning this issue, see Pini (1999).
13. For significare, see Boehner (1958) and for denotari, Marmo (1984).
14. “Item repraesentatum debet esse prius cognitum; aliter repraesentans nunquam duceret in cognitionem repraesentati tamquam in simile. Exemplum: statua Herculis nunquam duceret me in cognitionem Herculis nisi prius vidissem Herculem; nec aliter possem scire utrum statua sit sibi similis aut non. Sed