Groupe μ distinguishes between an ‘endocentric’ series of semes or ‘conceptual’ properties (mode Σ) and an ‘exocentric’ series of parts or ’empirical’ properties (mode Π). An example of an endocentric series would be the entailment oak—tree—plant (curiously, the authors con-sider only one direction — «If x is a tree, then it is either a poplar or an oak or a birch» — without considering that, if л: is a poplar, then it is necessarily a plant; but the two directions are obviously complementary). An example of an exocentric series would be the relation between a tree and its parts: trunk and branches and leaves. The distinction between the two modes could be represented as in Figure 3.4.
Σ Π
Vegetal
Tree
Poplar or birch or pine
FIGURE 3.4
Trunk
Branches
Leaves
Groupe μ knows very well that «these endoseries [that is, endocentric series] exist in posse in the vocabulary; but it is we who trace their exist-ence there, for each word or concept can, in principle, be the crossing Point of as many series as it contains semes» (1970; Eng. tr., p. 100). out after having shown this critical awareness of a dictionary’s metalin-guistic mechanisms, Groupe μ does not draw from that the conse-quences it should, and falls into a sort of Aristotelian identification of categories with things. Consider the way in which the various metaphor-ical constructions are explained by means of a double synecdochic ex-change, from a generalizing synecdoche (Sg) to a particularizing synec-doche (Sp), and vice versa, whether in the X mode or the Π mode.
The rule proposed is that the term /, which remains absent from the metaphorical interpretation, must be a synecdoche of the term of origin Z), while the term of arrival A must be a synecdoche of/. The condition is that A and D must be on the same level of generality. According to mode Σ, the resulting metaphor will be based on semes common to D and A, while in mode П it will base itself on their common parts. The material part must be smaller than the whole, while the semic part must be more general. (See Figure 3.5.)
General Scheme D (I) A
(a) (Sg + Sp)Σ Flexible
Possible metaphor Birch
(b) (Sg + Sp) П
Impossible metaphor Hand
(c) (Sp + Sg)Σ Green
Impossible metaphor
Girl
Man
Head
Flexible
Birch
(d) (Sp + Sg)П Boat Denture
Possible metaphor Bridge
FIGURE 3.5
Example (a) is incorrect. That a birch is flexible is а П property, un-less one should change the dictionary tree and consider the genus of all flexible things (of which obviously birches are one among the species). If we look again carefully at the preceding scheme, a (more) acceptable example would be /poplar of the desert/ for «palm tree» (from palm to tree and from tree to poplar).
Example (b) is correct, because one cannot say /he shook my head/ in place of «he shook my hand». But the mechanism it exemplifies is not at all impossible. The oneiric situation (or an instance of Witz) in which a nose represents the penis (both being parts of a human body) is not at all unthinkable. Why should nose be able to metaphorize penis, and hand not be able to metaphorize head? The answer is suggested at various moments by Greimas (1966): two semes can be opposed or joined ac-cording to their ‘classeme’ (which is nothing other than a ‘contextual selection’; cf. Eco 1976, 1979). Nose and penis have in common the characteristics of being ‘appendages’ and of being ‘long’ (besides the fact that both are canals, both are pointed, and so on). A head instead has semes of ’roundness’, ‘apicality’, and ‘oneness’, which a hand does not have. The substitution, then, is not based only on a play of synecdoches — it puts into question a semic relation that is far more complex, where the common reference of both nose and penis to human body is contextually irrelevant. Only in this way does the effect of superimposition that is typical of the processes of condensation take place.
As regards example (c), again it seems that Groupe μ has chosen as dictionary (or Σ) properties those that seem more appropriately Π properties — without making clear the contextual reasons that make it necessary to assume them as dictionary properties in the first place. It is true, though, that the metaphor in (c) appears impossible inasmuch as it passes from a genus to a species, proceeding then from that species to another genus that has nothing in common, however, with the first. Ac-cording to Group μ such would be the case where there were a passage from the genus ‘iron’ to the species ‘blade’ and then from the species ‘blade’ to the genus ‘flat object’. The coexistence in one same object of ferrous and flat qualities would not produce an intersection of properties. Finally, we come to case (d). Groupe /x’s example is acceptable. One can also think of the passage from crude oil to ‘precious’ (а П property of crude oil): from the property ‘precious’ one ascends to another lexeme to which the same marker could be ascribed, for example, gold, and there would follow the substitution gold/oil in a metaphor such as /the gold of the sheikhs/ or /black gold/ for «oil». But, even in this case, other properties would come into question, such as ‘black’ or ‘of the sheikhs’, which Groupe μ,’s scheme does not take into consideration. These are all
problems that we will try to resolve further on.
At the close of this discussion of the Aristotelian proposal, we can say that two clusters of problems have been brought into relief: (i) the existence of processes of condensation, which the proportional relation is bard put to explain; and (2) the need for a more flexible consideration of the relations between dictionary properties and encyclopedic properties, which can only be distinguished according to contextual exigencies. Why then has Aristotle’s proposal held myriad interpreters in fascination through the centuries? Two facts have played a role in the matter, that is, responsibility lies with a misunderstanding, on the one hand, and an extremely lucid insight, on the other.
3.8.The cognitive function
That misunderstanding or ambiquity arises when Aristotle, in passing from his consideration of the first three types of metaphor to the fourth type, changes his game without even being aware of it: in speaking of the first three types, he explains how a metaphor is produced and understood, whereas in speaking of the fourth type he explains what a metaphor enables us to know. In the first three cases, he says how the metaphorical production and interpretation function (and that he can do because the mechanism, which is synecdochic, is rather simple and is based on the inflexible logic of a Porphyrian tree, however that tree is selected). In the fourth case, Aristotle tells what the metaphor says, or in what way it increases our knowledge of the relations between things though he explains it only partly.
The metaphor cup of Ares certainly raises the suspicion that some indeterminate relation exists between cup and shield, and between Ares and Dionysus. But the theory of conden-sation explains that what we learn is not just that. The Aristotelian pro-portion is an empty schema where infinite pieces of encyclopedic infor-mation can be inserted; but what a metaphor allows us to know has more to do with those inserted items of knowledge than with the schematic relation that is filled up. The later periods of the metaphorological tradi-tion hold up the theory of the proportion or analogy as an explanation of the metaphor’s mechanisms — at the cost of a self-debasing chain of tautologies (for example, «a metaphor is that thing that permits us to have knowledge that is analogical, in other words, metaphorical») — and frequently ignore the most ingenious and vigorous of Aristotle’s conclu-sions, that the metaphor is not only a means of delight but also, and above all, a tool of cognition (as Freud, moreover, was able to show with regard to Witze).
When reading the Aristotelian texts (the Poetics and the Rhetoric), one is struck by the fact that examples of metaphor that are not convincing often appear, where the translator-philologist himself admits to not being able to grasp the obviousness of a proportion assumed as self-evident. One often has the same response, moreover, when confronting texts from distant cultures. Consider, for example, the Song of Songs: «I have compared thee, О my love, to a company of horses . . .» (Song 1:9); «Thy teeth are as a flock of sheep which go up from the washing» (ibid., 4:2); «Her legs are as pillars of marble . . .» (ibid., 5:15); «Thy nose is as the tower of Lebanon . . .» (ibid., 7:4). Notice that these are similes and therefore give the proportion in advance rather than suggest it in the form of an enigma. If a metaphor were only the contraction of an already posited proportion —so that, from the perspective of production, one starts from the simile and, interpretively speaking, one arrives at it —a simile would always be convincing. And yet it cannot be denied that one is led to see sheep coming out of the water as shaggy, dripping creatures (bleating and smelly, as well): a terrible premise on which to build an analogy on the «black but comely» maiden whose «two breasts are like two young does that are twins» (ibid., 7:3).
Nevertheless, we can imagine how the biblical poet drops all those
