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Bondage of the Will
with God’s justice. In fact, he acknowledges that he cannot; begs off, and then makes unwarrantable concessions. This difficulty arises from his imperfect conception of the creation and fall of man. If every individual of the human race had a distinct personal subsistence given to him in the creation of Adam; and consequently, had a distinct personal subsistence in him when he broke his commandment; and as this distinct substance was one with him who by his sole personal agency broke that commandment (the union of these many distinct substances in and with his one substance in now way contradicting the sole and distinct agency of the one first man, Adam) — then where is the injustice of God’s bringing out each of these distinct individuals, one after another, into manifest existence and distinct personal agency, and — having given to them individually, for the most part, the opportunity of showing what they are, according to their own making of themselves, not according to his making of them — inflicting upon them the judgment which he had distinctly fore-announced, which by their disobedience as one with Adam they had wilfully incurred, and which for the most part they have by their own subsequent actings in this world, proved to be their due, suitable, and self-made portion? God has been pleased to make provision for the mitigation, removal, and reversal of this sentence, in some of those who have justly incurred it, clearly, those who suffer have justly incurred it; and therefore, God is only just in inflicting it.
Through not discerning the mystery of the creation, Luther accounted God the creator of these wicked ones, as we have several times seen; and in consequence, through not discerning their participation in the fall, he accounted God their debtor, to give them an equivalent for that Freewill, or rather that knowledge of only good, which Adam had possessed, and which Luther did not see how they had forfeited. I say knowledge of only good, because Adam had no more of Freewill, properly so-called, than we have, as has been shown. With respect to the justice of God in this transaction, then, there can be no question — though Luther makes one. Justice is the fulfilment of relations; God had fulfilled all His when man incurred his fore-announced curse.
What does justice then require, but that it be exacted? Again, with respect to God’s right of instituting such relations as He did between himself and the human race in Adam, there can be no question. God has a right to form any creature that he is pleased and has power to form. To be consistent with himself, he will give them due relations, and will fulfil his own part in those relations. Now, what was lacking in the relations that he gave to Adam? Did He not give him reason and knowledge, by which he ought to have resisted the temptation? And if Adam had enough, what could the distinct substances which were in him complain, if God put their safety upon the issue of his obedience? What difference would there have been, or could they pretend there would have been, in the result, if each of them distinctly and personally had undergone the same trial?
But I do not deem this consideration at all necessary: it is the union and unity of each individual of the human race with Adam, while still retaining his individuality, which constitutes his original sin and his original guilt, and from which the loss of his creation state and of his creation character was derived. The only question that can be asked in all this mystery, respects the goodness — that is, the lovingkindness of God. It is here that Paul puts the difficulty; it is here that he calls for submission; and it is here that he assigns the principle of the procedure. “Is there not unrighteousness?” For it will come to this: no man has done otherwise than God designed. The answer is, God has exercised his right of the potter, and has exercised it for a great and wise reason. “What if,” etc. The man whose eyes the Lord has opened will see and search into these things, and will justify God at his heart. Nor will Paul, with his Isaiah, condemn him. He is using what God has done and has revealed, to the very end for which He has done and revealed it. See Part iii. Sect. 38. note . Part iv. Sect. 10. note
z , Sect. 11. note h , and Sect. 34. note d .
[←766]
Luther’s mention makes it doubtful which of the two Plinies he refers to; whether to the great naturalist or his nephew. Neither of them, however, saw in the works of nature, anything more than matter. Both were amiable, as natural men, and the former was a monument of philosophy and industry, called by some the martyr of nature, but more fitly called the martyr of curiosity and self-will. The latter was a well-bred, lettered persecutor of Christians; but he was too proud to inquire into their doctrines, and was not afraid, though reluctant, to shed their blood. For some excellent remarks on his character, see Miln. Eccl. Hist. vol. i. pp. 166-172. For a hint at the Epicureans, who were like their master — ‘Epicuri de grege porcus’ — See above, Part i. Sect. 5. note l. For a confirmation of what is said here about Aristotle, see above, Part iv. Sect. 8. note r .
[←767]
Demosthenes, abandoned in fact by his countrymen after having fled to the temple of Neptune in Calauria, sucked his poisoned quill. Cicero was delivered up to his philippicized Antony.
[←768]
If the observations of the preceding note are correct, we do not want Luther’s illustration, with its distinctions. We need not wait for the decision and discoveries of the great day, to see God just. Nor are his assumptions admissible. God has never left the eternity of man and the future judgment without witness. If these things have been obscured, it is not by God’s having put them into the dark, but because men have wilfully shut their eyes to them. The new creation kingdom was announced at the fall — and it has been variously preached ever since, to the whole earth. The kingdom of grace does not leave God under the suspicion of injustice. Man has made himself that damned thing which he is. The elect are not crowned sinners. The union of the elect with Christ, and the lack of this union in the reprobate, with its consequent self-left state, explains both dooms, in perfect consistency with divine equity. The illustration, therefore, is both unneeded and untrue. It is unneeded, inasmuch as the spiritual man even now sees the inflexible justice of God to be without spot — what it assuredly is; and it is untrue, inasmuch as Luther’s insolvable questions are resolved under those lights which he declares to be severally inadequate.
[←769]
Pertinacity: persistent determination; that is, if the listener does not doggedly refuse to hear the truth.
[←770]
A still inferior view to what he has given us before of original sin, but a very common one: here he takes it for that vitiation of nature, which is the consequence of it — instead of that first sin, which gave origin to the vitiation. But the argument against Freewill is not affected; the consequent vitiation is in no way less than he represents it to be.
[←771]
He briefly recites certain additional considerations which must, each of them, be conclusive upon this subject. 1. God’s foreknowledge and predestination. 2. Satan’s lordship over the world. 3. Original sin. 4. The case of the apostate and rejected Jews, as contrasted with the conversion of the Gentiles. 5. Christ the Redeemer as unnecessary, or his benefit vilified.
[←772]
Ita per Satanam. Very true as to instrumentality. But from where, then, does this ingratitude come? Could not God cure it? Could not he drive out the Canaanite altogether from the land? Regenerate man, and a revived church, is still Adam; and it is the glory of God to save and glorify an Adam. He must be shown therefore, or rather he must show himself, what he is. His Canaan is not yet the Lord’s world, nor is he yet the risen God-man. The time of ingratitude is yet; and it is yet, because the Lord’s real and designed glory requires that it should be so. There is something satisfying, and cheering, and enlightening, in this view of the Lord’s present dealings with his church and people, which reconciles us to what must otherwise be a constant burden and distress, and which leaves no more questions to be asked. Luther did not have distinct perceptions of the origin, nature, and design of evil; and while he talked much about Satan, he did not understand him well enough to put him in his place.
[←773]
That is, Erasmus was merely “talking about” these things, rather than asserting they are categorically true.
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with God's justice. In fact, he acknowledges that he cannot; begs off, and then makes unwarrantable concessions. This difficulty arises from his imperfect conception of the creation and fall of