SECT. 6. Ecclesiasticus 15.15-18
The first is taken from Wisdom 15.15-18 300: “The Lord made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commands, and his precepts. If you are willing to keep his commandments, and to perform acceptable faithfulness forever, they shall preserve you. He has set fire and water before you; stretch forth your hand to whichever you will. Before man is life and death, good and evil, whichever he likes shall be given to him.” 301
Although I might justly reject this book, I admit it for the moment, so that I may not lose my time by involving myself in a dispute about the books received into the Hebrew canon (which you ridicule and revile not a little) — comparing the Proverbs of Solomon and the Love-song (as you entitle it by an ambiguous sort of jeer) with the two books of Esdras, Judith, the history of Susannah and of the Dragon, and Esther. 302 This last, however, they have received into their canon, although in my judgment, it deserves to be excluded more than all the rest. But I would answer briefly in your own words: ‘the Scripture is obscure and ambiguous in this passage.’ It therefore proves nothing with certainty. And maintaining the negative as we do, I demand that you produce a place which proves by clear words, what Freewill is, and what Freewill can effect. Perhaps you will do this on the Greek calends. 303 However, to avoid this necessity, you waste many good words in marching over the ears of corn, 304 and reciting so many opinions on Freewill, that you almost make Pelagius evangelical. 305
Again, you invent four kinds of grace so that you may be able to assign some sort of faith and charity even to the heathen philosophers. Again, you invent that threefold law of nature, works, and faith. This is a new figment by which you enable yourself to maintain that the precepts of the heathen philosophers have a mighty coincidence with the precepts of the Gospel. Then again, you apply that affirmation in Psalm 4.6: “The light of your countenance has been marked upon us, Lord.” 306 This speaks of the knowledge of the very countenance of God (that is, of an operation of faith) to blinded reason. Now, let any Christian put all these things together, and he will be obliged to suspect that you are sporting and jesting with the dogmas and worship of Christians. For I find it most difficult indeed to attribute all this to ignorance, in a man who has so thoroughly ransacked 307 all our documents, and so diligently treasured them up and remembered them. But I will abstain for the present, content with this short hint till a fitter opportunity offers itself. But let me beg of you, my Erasmus, do not tease us any more in this way, with your ‘Who sees me?’ Nor is it safe, in so weighty a matter, to continually play at making Vertumnuses of words with everybody. 308
SECT. 7. Opinions on Freewill stated.
You make three opinions on Freewill out of one. You account it a harsh opinion, 309 which denies that a man can will anything good without special grace — that he can begin anything good, go on with anything good, and complete anything good. But though harsh, you account it highly approvable. It approves itself to you as leaving man in possession of desire and endeavour, but not leaving him anything to ascribe to his own powers. The opinion of those who maintain that Freewill can do nothing but sin, that only grace works good in us, seems still harsher to you. But harshest of all, is that opinion which affirms that Freewill is an empty name: that God works both good and evil in us. It is against these two last opinions, that you profess to write.
SECT. 8. Erasmus inconsistent with his definition.
Do you even know what you are saying, my Erasmus? You make three opinions here, as if they were the opinions of three different sects. You do not perceive that it is the same thing declared in different words, with a twofold variety by us, who are the same persons, and professors of one sect. But let me warn you of your carelessness, or dullness of intellect; and expose it.
I ask then, how does the definition of Freewill which you have given above, correspond with this first opinion of yours; which you declare to be highly approvable?
For you said that Freewill is a power of the human will, by which a man can apply himself to good. But here you say and approve its being said that a man cannot will good, without grace. Your definition affirms what its illustration denies; and there is found ‘a yea and nay’ in your Freewill. Thus, at the same time you both approve and condemn us; no, you condemn and approve yourself in one and the same dogma and article. 310 Do you not think it good, that it applies itself to those things which pertain to everlasting salvation? This is what your definition attributes to Freewill; and yet there is no need of grace if there is so much good in Freewill, that it can apply itself to good. So then, the Freewill which you define is different from the Freewill which you defend; and Erasmus has two Freewills more than others have, and those are quite at variance with each other.
SECT. 9. The approvable opinion considered.
But, dismissing that Freewill which your definition has invented, let us look at this contrary one, which the opinion itself sets before us. You grant that a man cannot will good without special grace. And we are not now discussing what the grace of God can do, but what man can do without grace. You grant, therefore, that Freewill cannot will good. This is nothing else than saying it cannot apply itself to those things which pertain to eternal salvation, as you sang out in your definition. Indeed, you say a little before, that the human will is so depraved that, having lost its liberty, it is compelled to serve sin, and cannot restore itself to any better sort of produce. If I am not mistaken, you represent the Pelagians to have been of this opinion. Now, I think there is no escape here for my Proteus.
He is caught and held by open words; to wit, that the will, having lost its liberty, is driven into, and held fast in, the service of sin. O exquisite Freewill which having lost its freedom, is declared by Erasmus himself to be the servant of sin! When Luther said this, ‘nothing had ever been heard that is more absurd,’ ‘nothing could be published that is more mischievous than this paradox.’ Diatribes must be written against him!
But perhaps nobody will take my word for it, that Erasmus has really said these things: let this passage of Diatribe be read, and it will excite wonder. I am not greatly surprised. The man who does not consider this a serious subject, and is never affected with the cause that he is pleading, but is altogether alienated from it in heart, and is tired of it, and chills under it, or is nauseated by it — how such a one can one do other than say absurd things here and there, incongruous things, discordant things, pleading the cause as he does. He is like a drunken or sleeping man who belches out ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ as the sounds fall variously upon his ears. It is on this account that rhetoricians require feeling in an advocate; and theology much more requires such a degree of emotion in her champion, that it will render him vigilant, sharp-sighted, intent, thoughtful, and strenuous.
SECT. 10. The approvable opinion further considered.
If Freewill without grace, having lost her freedom, is obliged to serve sin, and cannot will good, then I would like to know what that desire is, what that endeavour is, which this first and approvable opinion leaves to a man? 311 It cannot be good desire, it cannot be good endeavour: because he cannot will good — as the opinion says, and as you have conceded. Therefore, evil desire and evil endeavour alone are left — which, now that liberty is lost, are compelled to serve sin. And what is meant, I ask, by that saying, ‘This opinion leaves desire and endeavour, but it does not leave that which may be ascribed to the man’s own powers?’
Who can conceive of this? If desire and endeavour are left to Freewill, then why should they not be ascribed to it? If they are not to be ascribed, then how can they be left? Are this desire and endeavour, which subsist before grace, left even to that very grace which is to come, and not to Freewill? This is to be at the same time left and not left to this same Freewill. If these are
