I answer, if they are meaningless, it is your own fault that they are so, or rather, that they are nothing at all. You make this non-entity of them by asserting that nothing is ascribed to the human will, so long as you represent that Freewill cannot will good. And here, on the other hand, you represent that it can will all good — unless the same words are both hot and cold in the same instant. As you use them, they at once assert everything and deny everything. 408 Truly I am at a loss to think why an author would be pleased to say the same thing so many times over, perpetually forgetting his thesis — unless perchance, through mistrust of his cause, he had a mind to gain the victory by the size of his book, or to wear out his adversary by making it tedious and burdensome to peruse.
By what sort of consequence, I would ask, does it follow that will and power must at once be present to the soul, as often as it is said, ‘If you will,’ ‘if a man wills,’ ‘if you are willing,’ Do we not most frequently denote impotency and impossibility by such expressions, rather than the contrary? As in these examples: ‘If you would equal Virgil in singing, my Maevius, you must sing other songs;’ ‘If you would surpass Cicero, my Scotus, you must exchange your subtleties for the most consummate eloquence;’ ‘If you would be compared with David, you must utter Psalms like his,’ By these conditionals, it is plain that what is denoted are things which are impossible to attain by our own powers; while by a divine power all things are possible to us. Thus it is with the Scriptures also: such words declare what may be done in us by the power of God, and what we cannot do of ourselves.
Besides, if such things were said about actions that are absolutely impossible, such as those which even God would never at any time do by us, then they would be rightly called either cold or ridiculous, for being said to no purpose. But the truth is, these expressions are used not only to show the impotency of Freewill, which causes none of these things to be done by us, but they also intimate, at the same time, that all such things are about to be done, and are to be done (at some time or other), even though they are done by another’s power (even God’s). And this is only if we admit that in such words, there is some intimation that the things which are to be done, are possible. It is as if someone interpreted the words this way: ‘If you are willing to keep the commandments,’ that is, ‘If at some time you possess a will to keep the commandments (though you would possess a will, not of yourself, but of God who gives it to whomever He wills to give it), then they shall preserve you.’
Or to speak more freely, these verbs, particularly the conjunctive verbs, seem to be inserted this way on account of God’s predestination also — as being that which we do not know — and to involve it. As if they meant to say, ‘If you will,’ ‘If you are willing,’ that is, ‘If you are such in the sight of God, that He counts you worthy of this will to keep the commandments, then you shall be saved,’ Each of these two things is couched under this trope: 409 namely, that, on the one hand we can do nothing of ourselves; and on the other, whatever we do, God works it in us. I would speak this way to those who would not be content to have it said that only our impotency is expressed by these words, but who would maintain that they prove a certain power and ability to do those things which are enjoined. Thus, it would at once be true that we could do none of the things commanded, and could at the same time do all of them — if we were to apply impotency to our own powers, and power to the grace of God. 410
SECT. 35. Erasmus’ objection that precepts are given, and merit is ascribed to Freewill, considered. — Erasmus inconsistent with himself.
Thirdly, Diatribe is affected by this consideration:
‘Where there is such frequent mention of good and bad works,’ she says, ‘where there is mention of reward, I do not see how there can be a place for mere necessity. Neither nature, nor necessity, has merit.’ 411
Nor do I truly understand how there can be a place for mere necessity; except that the ‘approvable opinion’ asserts mere necessity in saying that Freewill can will nothing good; but here, it attributes even merit to it. Freewill has made such advances during the growth of this book, and Diatribe’s disputation, that now she not only has desire and endeavour as hers (however, by a strength that is not her own); and she not only wills and does good; but she even merits eternal life. Because Christ says in the Mat 5.12, “Rejoice and be exceeding glad, for your reward is abundant in the heavens.” Your reward; that is, Freewill’s reward: for so Diatribe understands this text, making Christ and the Spirit to be nothing. For what need is there of Christ and the Spirit, if we have good works and merits through Freewill?
I mention this, so that we may see how common it is for men of excellent abilities to be prone to show a blindness in matters which are manifest to even a dull and uncultivated mind; and how weak an argument is drawn from human authority in divine things, where divine authority alone has weight. 412
SECT. 36. New Testament precepts are addressed to the converted, not to those in Freewill.
Two distinct topics must be spoken to here: first, the precepts of the New Testament; and secondly, merit. I will dispatch each of these in few words, having spoken of them rather extensively on other occasions. The New Testament properly consists of promises and exhortations, just as the Old Testament properly consists of laws and threatenings.
For, in the New Testament, the Gospel is preached; which is nothing else but a discourse offering the Spirit, together with grace, for that remission of sins which has been obtained for us by the crucifixion of Christ: and all of this is done gratuitously, only because the mercy of God the Father befriends us, unworthy as we are, and deserving damnation as we do, rather than anything else. Then follow exhortations, to stir up those who are already justified, and have already obtained mercy, to strenuously bring forth the fruits of that freely bestowed righteousness and of the Spirit; for acting out love in performing good works; and for bearing the cross and all other tribulations of the world with good courage. This is the sum of the entire New Testament.
Diatribe abundantly shows how entirely ignorant she is of this matter, in not knowing how to make the least differentiation between the Old and New Testaments. For she sees almost nothing in either, except laws and precepts by which men are to be conformed to good manners. What new birth is — what renewal, regeneration, and the whole work of the Spirit are — she does not see at all. This is to my utter wonder and astonishment, that a man who has laboured so long and so studiously in the Scriptures, should be so perfectly ignorant of them.
So then, this saying, “Rejoice and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in the heavens,” squares just about as well with Freewill, as light agrees with darkness. For Christ does not exhort Freewill in this, but he exhorts his Apostles to bear the tribulations of the world. They were not only in a state above Freewill, already being partakers of grace, and also just persons; but they were even established in the ministry of the word; that is, in the highest station of grace. But we are engaged in discussing Freewill, specifically as she subsists without grace. Freewill is instructed by laws and threatenings (that is, by the Old Testament) into the knowledge of herself, so that she may run to the promises that are set forth in the New. 413
SECT. 37. Merit and reward may consist with necessity.
But as to merit, or a reward being proposed, what is this but a sort of promise? This does not prove that we have any power — for nothing else is expressed by it except that if a man had done this or that thing, then he would have a reward. But our question is not how a reward, 414 or what sort of a reward, will be rendered to a man; but whether we can do those things for which a reward is rendered. This was the thing to be proved. Are these not ridiculous conclusions: The reward of the judge is proposed to all who are in the race; therefore all can run and obtain it? If Caesar conquers the Turk, then he will enjoy the kingdom of Syria: therefore Caesar can and does conquer the Turk.415 If Freewill rules over sin, it shall be holy to the Lord; therefore Freewill is holy to the Lord. But I will say no more about these superlatively stupid and palpably absurd reasonings, except that it
