SECT. 32. Difficulty stated and exposed.
But if this disturbs us, that it is difficult to maintain the mercy and equity of God in that he damns the undeserving — namely, ungodly men who are of such a sort that, being born in ungodliness, they cannot by any means help being ungodly; and remaining so, they are damned. Indeed, they are compelled by the necessity of their nature, to sin and perish. As Paul says, “We were all the sons of wrath even as others,” Eph 2.3 being created as such by God himself, out of a seed which became corrupted through that sin which was Adam’s only.
Difficulty exposed. In this state of things, we must honour and reverence the exceeding great mercy of God in his dealings with those whom he justifies and saves, even though most unworthy of such benefits. And we must at least make some small concession to his divine wisdom, believing him to be just, when to us he seems unjust. For if his justice were indeed pronounced just when it is judged by human apprehension, it would clearly not be divine justice, but differ not at all from man’s. Now, seeing that God is the one true God, and is moreover totally incomprehensible, and inaccessible to human reason, it is natural — indeed it is necessary — that his justice also be incomprehensible. Paul cries this: “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments and his ways unsearchable.” (Rom 11.33)
Now they would not be incomprehensible if we could, throughout the whole of them, conceive why they are just.
What is man compared with God? What is our power capable of, as compared with his? What is our strength compared with his might? What is our knowledge compared with his wisdom? What is our substance compared with his substance? In short, what is everything of ours, as compared with everything of his? 759
SECT. 33. Difficulty Reproved and palliated by example.
Now, using no other precept than nature, say we confess that man’s power, strength, wisdom, knowledge, substance, and everything of ours, is absolutely nothing when compared with God’s power, strength, wisdom, knowledge, and substance. What is this perverseness of ours, that we pull at and hale 760 God’s justice and judgment, 761 arrogating 762 so much to our own judgment, as to test whether we can comprehend, judge, and estimate the judgment of God? Why do we not, in like manner, say that our judgment is nothing if compared with the divine judgment? Ask reason herself, whether she is not compelled by conviction, to acknowledge that she is foolish and rash in not allowing the judgment of God to be incomprehensible, when she confesses all the other properties of God to be incomprehensible? What! In all other things we concede a divine majesty to God; it is only in his judgment that we are prepared to deny it to him, and cannot, even for this little while, give him credit for being just. Yet he has promised us that, after he has revealed his glory, it will come to pass that all of us will then both see and feel, that he has been, and is just.
I will give an example to confirm this belief, and to console that evil eye 763 which suspects God of injustice.
Behold, God so governs this material world in outward things, that if you observe and follow the judgment of human reason, you are compelled to say either there is no God, or there is an unjust God. As that poet says, “I am often solicited to think that there are no Gods.” For see how true it is that the wicked are most prosperous, and the good, on the other hand, are most unfortunate. Even proverbs, and experience, which is the mother of proverbs, testify that the more wicked men are, the more fortunate.’ “The tabernacles of the wicked abound,” says Job 12.6. And the 73d Psalm complains that sinners abound with riches in this world. 764 Is it not most unjust in the judgment of all men, I ask, that the wicked should be prospered, and the good afflicted? 765
Yet, such is the course of the world. It is here that even the greatest wits have fallen to the depth of denying that there is a God, and of feigning that Fortune turns and twists everything as the whim takes her: such were the Epicureans and Pliny. Following close upon these, Aristotle, to deliver that first Being of his from misery, is of the opinion that he does not see any of the things that exist, except himself; because he considers that it would be most painful for him to see so much of evil, and so much of injustice. 766
The Prophets, on the other hand, who believed that there is a God, are more tempted with the suggestion of God’s injustice: such as Jeremiah, Job, David, Asaph and others. What do you imagine Demosthenes and Cicero thought, when after having done all they could, they received the wages they did, in a wretched death? 767 Yet this injustice of God — which is exceedingly probable, and inferred by such arguments, that no power of reason or light of nature can resist — is most easily removed by the light of the Gospel and the knowledge of grace. These teach us that the wicked flourish in their body, it is true, but they perish in their souls.
Thus, we have the brief solution to this insolvable question in a single short sentence. ‘There is a life after this life, in which whatever has not been punished and rewarded here, will hereafter be punished and rewarded; seeing that this life is nothing but the precursor, or rather the beginning, of the life to come.’ The light of the Gospel, then, which owes all its power to the word and faith, is so efficacious, that this question — handled as it had been in all ages, but never answered — has thoroughly made an end of it and laid it to rest. What then do you think will happen when the light of the word and of faith has ceased, and when the reality, even the divine Majesty itself, is revealed as it is? Do you not think that the light of glory will then be able to solve, with the greatest ease, that question which is insolvable in the light of the word, or of grace — seeing that the light of grace has so readily solved a question which could not be solved by the light of nature?
Let it be conceded, then, that there are three great lights — the light of nature, the light of grace, and the light of glory — according to the common distinction (which is a good one). In the light of nature, it cannot be explained that it is just for the good man to be afflicted, and for the bad man to prosper. But the light of grace resolves this question. In the light of grace, it is inexplicable how God condemns the man who cannot, by any power of his own, do other than sin, and to be guilty. In this case, the light of nature, as well as the light of grace, declares that the fault is not in wretched man, but in an unjust God. For how can they judge otherwise about God? For he crowns a wicked man gratuitously, without any merits; and He does not crown another, but condemns him who is perhaps less wicked, or at least he is not more wicked.
But the light of glory proclaims something else. And when it arrives, it will show that God — whose judgment, for the present, is incomprehensible justice — is most just, and this is most manifest justice. In the meantime, it teaches us to believe the certainty of this coming event. By the example of the light of grace, we are admonished and confirmed in the expectation of it; this produces a like portent with respect to the light of nature. 768
SECT. 34. Sum of the argument.
Here I will put an end to this treatise. I am prepared, if needed, to plead the cause yet further. Although, I consider that I have said enough to satisfy the pious mind, which is willing to yield to the force of truth without pertinacity.769 For, if we believe it to be true, that God foreknows and predestines everything; and moreover, that he can neither be mistaken nor hindered in his foreknowledge and predestination; and once more, that nothing is done outside his will (a truth which reason herself is compelled to yield) — then it follows from the
