is quite subjugated.
So according to history it has been found from the most
ancient times, and so it is to our own day. All Napoleon’s
wars serve to confirm this rule. In proportion to the defeat
of the Austrian army Austria loses its rights, and the rights
and the strength of France increase. The victories of the
French at Jena and Auerstadt destroy the independent existence of Prussia.
But then, in 1812, the French gain a victory near Moscow.
Moscow is taken and after that, with no further battles, it is
not Russia that ceases to exist, but the French army of six
hundred thousand, and then Napoleonic France itself. To
strain the facts to fit the rules of history: to say that the field
of battle at Borodino remained in the hands of the Russians,
or that after Moscow there were other battles that destroyed
Napoleon’s army, is impossible.
After the French victory at Borodino there was no general engagement nor any that were at all serious, yet the
French army ceased to exist. What does this mean? If it
were an example taken from the history of China, we might
say that it was not an historic phenomenon (which is the
historians’ usual expedient when anything does not fit their
standards); if the matter concerned some brief conflict in
which only a small number of troops took part, we might
treat it as an exception; but this event occurred before our
fathers’ eyes, and for them it was a question of the life or
death of their fatherland, and it happened in the greatest of
all known wars.
1939
The period of the campaign of 1812 from the battle of
Borodino to the expulsion of the French proved that the
winning of a battle does not produce a conquest and is not
even an invariable indication of conquest; it proved that the
force which decides the fate of peoples lies not in the conquerors, nor even in armies and battles, but in something
else.
The French historians, describing the condition of the
French army before it left Moscow, affirm that all was in
order in the Grand Army, except the cavalry, the artillery,
and the transportthere was no forage for the horses or the
cattle. That was a misfortune no one could remedy, for the
peasants of the district burned their hay rather than let the
French have it.
The victory gained did not bring the usual results because the peasants Karp and Vlas (who after the French
had evacuated Moscow drove in their carts to pillage the
town, and in general personally failed to manifest any heroic feelings), and the whole innumerable multitude of such
peasants, did not bring their hay to Moscow for the high
price offered them, but burned it instead.
Let us imagine two men who have come out to fight a
duel with rapiers according to all the rules of the art of fencing. The fencing has gone on for some time; suddenly one of
the combatants, feeling himself wounded and understanding that the matter is no joke but concerns his life, throws
down his rapier, and seizing the first cudgel that comes to
hand begins to brandish it. Then let us imagine that the
combatant who so sensibly employed the best and simplest
1940
War and Peace
means to attain his end was at the same time influenced by
traditions of chivalry and, desiring to conceal the facts of
the case, insisted that he had gained his victory with the rapier according to all the rules of art. One can imagine what
confusion and obscurity would result from such an account
of the duel.
The fencer who demanded a contest according to the
rules of fencing was the French army; his opponent who
threw away the rapier and snatched up the cudgel was the
Russian people; those who try to explain the matter according to the rules of fencing are the historians who have
described the event.
After the burning of Smolensk a war began which did
not follow any previous traditions of war. The burning of
towns and villages, the retreats after battles, the blow dealt
at Borodino and the renewed retreat, the burning of Moscow, the capture of marauders, the seizure of transports,
and the guerrilla war were all departures from the rules.
Napoleon felt this, and from the time he took up the
correct fencing attitude in Moscow and instead of his opponent’s rapier saw a cudgel raised above his head, he did
not cease to complain to Kutuzov and to the Emperor Alexander that the war was being carried on contrary to all
the rulesas if there were any rules for killing people. In spite
of the complaints of the French as to the nonobservance of
the rules, in spite of the fact that to some highly placed Russians it seemed rather disgraceful to fight with a cudgel and
they wanted to assume a pose en quarte or en tierce according to all the rules, and to make an adroit thrust en prime,
1941
and so onthe cudgel of the people’s war was lifted with all
its menacing and majestic strength, and without consulting
anyone’s tastes or rules and regardless of anything else, it
rose and fell with stupid simplicity, but consistently, and belabored the French till the whole invasion had perished.
And it is well for a people who do notas the French did
in 1813salute according to all the rules of art, and, presenting the hilt of their rapier gracefully and politely, hand it to
their magnanimous conqueror, but at the moment of trial,
without asking what rules others have adopted in similar
cases, simply and easily pick up the first cudgel that comes
to hand and strike with it till the feeling of resentment and
revenge in their soul yields to a feeling of contempt and
compassion.
1942
War and Peace
Chapter II
One of the most obvious and advantageous departures
from the so-called laws of war is the action of scattered
groups against men pressed together in a mass. Such action
always occurs in wars that take on a national character. In
such actions, instead of two crowds opposing each other,
the men disperse, attack singly, run away when attacked by
stronger forces, but again attack when opportunity offers.
This was done by the guerrillas in Spain, by the mountain
tribes in the Caucasus, and by the Russians in 1812.
People have called this kind of war ‘guerrilla warfare’
and assume that by so calling it they have explained its
meaning. But such a war does not fit in under any rule and
is directly opposed to a well-known rule of tactics which is
accepted as infallible. That rule says that an attacker should
concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his opponent at the moment of conflict.
Guerrilla war (always successful, as history shows) directly infringes that rule.
This contradiction arises from the fact that military science assumes the strength of an army to be identical with
its numbers. Military science says that the more troops the
greater the strength. Les gros bataillons ont toujours raison.*
*Large battalions are always victorious.
1943
For military science to say this is like defining momentum in mechanics by reference to the mass only: stating that
momenta are equal or unequal to each other simply because
the masses involved are equal or unequal.
Momentum (quantity of motion) is the product of mass
and velocity.
In military affairs the strength of an army is the product
of its mass and some unknown x.
Military science, seeing in history innumerable instances of the fact that the size of any army does not coincide
with its strength and that small detachments defeat larger
ones, obscurely admits the existence of this unknown factor and tries to discover itnow in a geometric formation,
now in the equipment employed, now, and most usually, in
the genius of the commanders. But the assignment of these
various meanings to the factor does not yield results which
accord with the historic facts.
Yet it is only necessary to abandon the false view (adopted to gratify the ‘heroes’) of the efficacy of the directions
issued in wartime by commanders, in order to find this unknown quantity.
That unknown quantity is the spirit of the army, that is
to say, the greater or lesser readiness to fight and face danger
felt by all the men composing an army, quite independently
of whether they are, or are not, fighting under the command
of a genius, in twoor three-line formation, with cudgels or
with rifles that repeat thirty times a minute. Men who want
to fight will always put themselves in the most advantageous conditions for fighting.
1944
War and Peace
The spirit of an army is the factor which multiplied by
the mass gives the resulting force. To define and express the
significance of this unknown factorthe spirit of an armyis a
problem for science.
This problem is only solvable if we cease arbitrarily to
substitute for the unknown x itself the conditions under
which that force becomes apparentsuch as the commands
of the general, the equipment employed, and so onmistaking these for the real significance of the factor, and if we
recognize this unknown quantity in its entirety as being the
greater or lesser desire to fight and to face danger. Only then,
expressing known historic facts by equations and comparing the relative significance of this factor, can we hope to
define the unknown.
Ten men, battalions, or divisions, fighting fifteen men,
battalions, or divisions, conquerthat is, kill or take captiveall the others, while themselves losing four, so that on
the one side four and on the other fifteen were lost. Consequently the four were equal to the fifteen, and therefore 4x
= 15y. Consequently x/y = 15/4. This equation does not give
us the value of the unknown factor but gives us a ratio between two unknowns. And by bringing variously selected
historic units (battles, campaigns, periods of war) into such
equations, a series of numbers could be obtained in which
certain laws should exist and might be discovered.
The tactical rule that an army should act in masses when
attacking, and in smaller groups in retreat, unconsciously
confirms the truth that the strength of an army depends on
its spirit. To lead men forward under fire more discipline
1945
(obtainable only by movement in masses) is needed than
is needed to resist attacks. But this rule which leaves out
of account
