then wiser and had more insight than at any other time,
and understood all that is worth understanding in life, because… because I was happy.’
Pierre’s insanity consisted in not waiting, as he used to
do, to discover personal attributes which he termed ‘good
qualities’ in people before loving them; his heart was now
overflowing with love, and by loving people without cause
he discovered indubitable causes for loving them.
CHAPTER XX
After Pierre’s departure that first evening, when Natasha
had said to Princess Mary with a gaily mocking smile: ‘He
looks just, yes, just as if he had come out of a Russian bathin
a short coat and with his hair cropped,’ something hidden and unknown to herself, but irrepressible, awoke in
Natasha’s soul.
Everything: her face, walk, look, and voice, was suddenly
altered. To her own surprise a power of life and hope of happiness rose to the surface and demanded satisfaction. From
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that evening she seemed to have forgotten all that had happened to her. She no longer complained of her position, did
not say a word about the past, and no longer feared to make
happy plans for the future. She spoke little of Pierre, but
when Princess Mary mentioned him a long-extinguished
light once more kindled in her eyes and her lips curved with
a strange smile.
The change that took place in Natasha at first surprised
Princess Mary; but when she understood its meaning it
grieved her. ‘Can she have loved my brother so little as to
be able to forget him so soon?’ she thought when she reflected on the change. But when she was with Natasha she was
not vexed with her and did not reproach her. The reawakened power of life that had seized Natasha was so evidently
irrepressible and unexpected by her that in her presence
Princess Mary felt that she had no right to reproach her
even in her heart.
Natasha gave herself up so fully and frankly to this new
feeling that she did not try to hide the fact that she was no
longer sad, but bright and cheerful.
When Princess Mary returned to her room after her nocturnal talk with Pierre, Natasha met her on the threshold.
‘He has spoken? Yes? He has spoken?’ she repeated.
And a joyful yet pathetic expression which seemed to
beg forgiveness for her joy settled on Natasha’s face.
‘I wanted to listen at the door, but I knew you would tell
me.’
Understandable and touching as the look with which
Natasha gazed at her seemed to Princess Mary, and sorry
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as she was to see her agitation, these words pained her for a
moment. She remembered her brother and his love.
‘But what’s to be done? She can’t help it,’ thought the
princess.
And with a sad and rather stern look she told Natasha all
that Pierre had said. On hearing that he was going to Petersburg Natasha was astounded.
‘To Petersburg!’ she repeated as if unable to understand.
But noticing the grieved expression on Princess Mary’s
face she guessed the reason of that sadness and suddenly
began to cry.
‘Mary,’ said she, ‘tell me what I should do! I am afraid of
being bad. Whatever you tell me, I will do. Tell me…’
‘You love him?’
‘Yes,’ whispered Natasha.
‘Then why are you crying? I am happy for your sake,’
said Princess Mary, who because of those tears quite forgave Natasha’s joy.
‘It won’t be just yetsomeday. Think what fun it will be
when I am his wife and you marry Nicholas!’
‘Natasha, I have asked you not to speak of that. Let us
talk about you.’
They were silent awhile.
‘But why go to Petersburg?’ Natasha suddenly asked, and
hastily replied to her own question. ‘But no, no, he must…
Yes, Mary, He must…’
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FIRST EPILOGUE: 1813 20
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Chapter I
Seven years had passed. The storm-tossed sea of European history had subsided within its shores and seemed
to have become calm. But the mysterious forces that move
humanity (mysterious because the laws of their motion are
unknown to us) continued to operate.
Though the surface of the sea of history seemed motionless, the movement of humanity went on as unceasingly as
the flow of time. Various groups of people formed and dissolved, the coming formation and dissolution of kingdoms
and displacement of peoples was in course of preparation.
The sea of history was not driven spasmodically from
shore to shore as previously. It was seething in its depths.
Historic figures were not borne by the waves from one
shore to another as before. They now seemed to rotate on
one spot. The historical figures at the head of armies, who
formerly reflected the movement of the masses by ordering wars, campaigns, and battles, now reflected the restless
movement by political and diplomatic combinations, laws,
and treaties.
The historians call this activity of the historical figures
‘the reaction.’
In dealing with this period they sternly condemn the historical personages who, in their opinion, caused what they
describe as the reaction. All the well-known people of that
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period, from Alexander and Napoleon to Madame de Stael,
Photius, Schelling, Fichte, Chateaubriand, and the rest, pass
before their stern judgment seat and are acquitted or condemned according to whether they conduced to progress or
to reaction.
According to their accounts a reaction took place at that
time in Russia also, and the chief culprit was Alexander I,
the same man who according to them was the chief cause
of the liberal movement at the commencement of his reign,
being the savior of Russia.
There is no one in Russian literature now, from schoolboy essayist to learned historian, who does not throw his
little stone at Alexander for things he did wrong at this period of his reign.
‘He ought to have acted in this way and in that way. In
this case he did well and in that case badly. He behaved admirably at the beginning of his reign and during 1812, but
acted badly by giving a constitution to Poland, forming
the Holy Alliance, entrusting power to Arakcheev, favoring Golitsyn and mysticism, and afterwards Shishkov and
Photius. He also acted badly by concerning himself with the
active army and disbanding the Semenov regiment.’
It would take a dozen pages to enumerate all the reproaches the historians address to him, based on their
knowledge of what is good for humanity.
What do these reproaches mean?
Do not the very actions for which the historians praise
Alexander I (the liberal attempts at the beginning of his
reign, his struggle with Napoleon, the firmness he dis
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played in 1812 and the campaign of 1813) flow from the
same sourcesthe circumstances of his birth, education, and
lifethat made his personality what it was and from which
the actions for which they blame him (the Holy Alliance,
the restoration of Poland, and the reaction of 1820 and later)
also flowed?
In what does the substance of those reproaches lie?
It lies in the fact that an historic character like Alexander I, standing on the highest possible pinnacle of human
power with the blinding light of history focused upon him;
a character exposed to those strongest of all influences:
the intrigues, flattery, and self-deception inseparable from
power; a character who at every moment of his life felt a responsibility for all that was happening in Europe; and not
a fictitious but a live character who like every man had his
personal habits, passions, and impulses toward goodness,
beauty, and truththat this characterthough not lacking in
virtue (the historians do not accuse him of that)had not the
same conception of the welfare of humanity fifty years ago
as a present-day professor who from his youth upwards has
been occupied with learning: that is, with books and lectures and with taking notes from them.
But even if we assume that fifty years ago Alexander I
was mistaken in his view of what was good for the people,
we must inevitably assume that the historian who judges
Alexander will also after the lapse of some time turn out
to be mistaken in his view of what is good for humanity.
This assumption is all the more natural and inevitable because, watching the movement of history, we see that every
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year and with each new writer, opinion as to what is good
for mankind changes; so that what once seemed good, ten
years later seems bad, and vice versa. And what is more, we
find at one and the same time quite contradictory views as
to what is bad and what is good in history: some people regard giving a constitution to Poland and forming the Holy
Alliance as praiseworthy in Alexander, while others regard
it as blameworthy.
The activity of Alexander or of Napoleon cannot be
called useful or harmful, for it is impossible to say for what
it was useful or harmful. If that activity displeases somebody, this is only because it does not agree with his limited
understanding of what is good. Whether the preservation
of my father’s house in Moscow, or the glory of the Russian
arms, or the prosperity of the Petersburg and other universities, or the freedom of Poland or the greatness of Russia,
or the balance of power in Europe, or a certain kind of European culture called ‘progress’ appear to me to be good or
bad, I must admit that besides these things the action of
every historic character has other more general purposes
inaccessible to me.
But let us assume that what is called science can harmonize all contradictions and possesses an unchanging
standard of good and bad by which to try historic characters and events; let us say that Alexander could have done
everything differently; let us say that with guidance from
those who blame him and who profess to know the ultimate
aim of the movement of humanity, he might have arranged
matters according to the program his present accusers
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would have given himof nationality, freedom, equality, and
progress (these, I think, cover the ground). Let us assume
that this program was possible and had then been formulated, and that Alexander had acted on it. What would then
have become of the activity of all those who opposed the
tendency that then prevailed in the governmentan activity
that in the opinion of the historians was good and beneficent? Their activity would not have existed: there would
have been no life, there would have
