We turn next to a proposal for resolving the Algerian problem.
1. Algeria 1957 (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1957).
2. The Syrian “nation,” only recently emerged from the French protectorate, melted like sugar in water into Nasser’s Arab republic.
3. The reference is to Janos Kadar, who led Hungary under Soviet domination from 1956 to 1988.—Trans.
4. See below.
27 The New Algeria
As things now stand, it has long seemed to me that the only regime likely to do justice to all segments of the population would be one similar to the Swiss confederation, which embraces several different nationalities. I think, however, that an even more novel system is needed. The Swiss population consists of different groups occupying different regions. Its institutions are designed solely to coordinate political life in the various cantons. By contrast, Algeria is one of the few examples of a country with different populations living together in the same territory.
A federation is first of all a union of differences, and what Algeria needs is an association not of different territories but of communities with different identities. Marc Lauriol, a professor of law in Algiers, has proposed a solution to this problem. Even if one does not approve of every last detail of his proposal, it seems to me particularly well adapted to Algerian realities and likely to satisfy the need for both justice and liberty that all the communities of Algeria share.
In essence, Prof. Lauriol’s proposal combines the advantages of integration and federalism. While respecting particular differences, it associates both Arab and French populations in the administration of their common interest. To that end, it recommends as a first step a parliamentary reform that would divide the French National Assembly into two sections: a metropolitan section and a Muslim section. The first would include elected officials from metropolitan France and the overseas territories, and the second Muslims living under Islamic law. The rule of proportionality would be strictly respected. One can therefore envisage a parliament of 600 metropolitan deputies, 15 representatives of the French in Algeria, and 100 Muslim deputies.
The Muslim section would deliberate separately on all matters pertaining to Muslims alone. The plenary session, combining both French and Muslims, would have jurisdiction over matters of concern to both communities (such as taxes and budget) or to both communities and the metropole (such as national defense). Other questions of interest solely to the metropole (particularly in regard to civil law) would remain exclusively within the competence of the metropolitan section.
So laws pertaining only to Muslims would be dealt with solely by Muslim deputies. Laws applicable to all would be decided by all. Laws applicable only to the French would be decided solely by French representatives. In this first phase of the plan, the government would be responsible to each section separately or to both combined, depending on the nature of the question to be decided.
In phase two, after a preliminary period leading to a general reconciliation, the consequences of this innovation would be evaluated. Contrary to all French custom and to firm biases inherited from the French Revolution, the proposal would create two categories of equal but distinct citizens. In this respect, it would constitute a sort of revolution against the regime of centralization and abstract individualism created in 1789, which for many reasons should now be seen as the Old Regime. Prof. Lauriol is nevertheless right to say that his proposal would give rise to nothing less than a federal state in France, an authentic French Commonwealth.1
Similar institutions could naturally find a place in a system that might eventually be joined by other countries of the Maghreb and black Africa. An Algerian regional assembly would then represent the distinctive views of Algeria, while a federal senate, in which Algeria would be represented, would wield legislative power in regard to matters of interest to the entire federation (such as defense and foreign affairs). It would also elect a federal government responsible to it. It is also important to note that this system is not incompatible with possible new institutions that may emerge in Europe.
That, in any case, should be the French proposal, which would then be maintained until a cease-fire was achieved. At the moment, the intransigence of the FLN has complicated that task. This intransigence is in part spontaneous and unrealistic and in part inspired and cynical. To the extent that it is spontaneous, one can understand it and try to neutralize it with a truly constructive proposal. To the extent that it is inspired, it is unacceptable. Independence is conditioned on a refusal of all negotiation and provocation of the worst excesses. France has no option but to stick to the proposal I described, seek its approval by international opinion and broader and broader segments of the Arab population, and work toward its gradual acceptance.
This is as much as one can imagine for the immediate future. Such a solution is not utopian in light of Algerian realities. It is uncertain only because of the state of French political society. Its success depends on:
1. A collective will in metropolitan France, and in particular a decision to accept an austerity policy, the brunt of which would have to be borne by the wealthier classes (the working class already bears the weight of a scandalously unjust tax system).
2. A government prepared to reform the Constitution (which in any case was approved only by a minority of the population) and ready and willing to initiate a steadfast, ambitious, long-range policy to establish a French federation.
Objective observers may well feel skeptical that these two conditions can be met. The advent of considerable new human and economic resources in both France and Algeria justifies hopes for renewal, however. If so, then a solution like the one described above has a chance. Otherwise, Algeria will be lost, with terrible consequences for both the Arabs and the French. This is the last warning that can be given by a writer who for the past 20 years has been dedicated to the Algerian cause, before he lapses once again into silence.
1. “Le Féderalisme et l’Algérie,” La Fédération, 9, rue Auber, Paris.
APPENDIX
Indigenous Culture: The New Mediterranean Culture1
FEBRUARY 8, 1937
I
The Maison de la Culture to which you are being introduced today claims to serve Mediterranean culture. In keeping with the program of other Maisons de la Culture, it aims to contribute, in a regional setting, to the promotion of a culture whose existence and importance are by now well-known. It is perhaps something of a surprise that left-wing intellectuals are willing to serve a culture that seems of little interest to their cause and that has to some extent been captured by doctrinaires of the right (such as Charles Maurras).2
To serve the cause of some form of Mediterranean regionalism might seem to be a throwback to a useless and unpromising variety of traditionalism. Or it might seem to posit the superiority of one culture over another, standing, say, fascism on its head by exalting the Latin peoples over the Nordic peoples. This is a source of perpetual misunderstanding. The purpose of this conference is to bring clarity to this question. The error stems from a confusion between Mediterranean and Latin, from ascribing to Rome what began in Athens. For us, it is clear that the only nationalism at issue here is the nationalism of sunshine. We will not subjugate ourselves to tradition or tie our vital future to exploits already dead.
A tradition is a past that counterfeits the present. Our Mediterranean is something else: a vibrant region, a realm of joy and smiles. Nationalism has in any case condemned itself by its deeds. In the eyes of history nationalism is always a sign of decadence. Only when the vast edifice of the Roman empire crumbled, when its spiritual unity, from which so many different parts of the world derived the ground of their existence, disintegrated, did nationalities emerge. Since then, the West has never regained its unity.
Internationalism is now attempting to restore the Western world’s true meaning and vocation. The principle is no longer Christian, however. It is no longer the papal Rome of the Holy Roman Empire. The principle is man. Unity is no longer a matter of faith but rather one of hope. A civilization is durable only to the extent that its unity and grandeur derive from a spiritual principle transcending all nations. India, which is almost as large as Europe but which has no nations or sovereign, has retained its distinct character despite two centuries of English rule.
That is why we reject the principle of Mediterranean nationalism out of hand. The idea of a superior Mediterranean culture is unacceptable. Man expresses himself in harmony with his surroundings, and superiority in the cultural realm depends solely on that harmony. No culture is greater than any other. Some are truer than others. Our only aim is to help this region express itself. Locally. Nothing more. The real question is whether a new Mediterranean culture is possible.
II. Facts
(a) There is a Mediterranean Sea, which links a dozen countries. The men who bellow in Spain’s musical cafés or loiter about the harbor of Genoa or the docks of Marseille, who belong to the hardy, curious breed that inhabits our coasts, are all members of the same family. When you
