The fight must itself be justified, and explained, in terms of values. One must fight for one’s truth while making sure not to kill that truth with the very arms employed to defend it: only if both criteria are satisfied can words recover their vital meaning. With this in mind, the role of the intellectual is to seek by his own lights to make out the respective limits of force and justice in each camp. It is to explain the meaning of words in such a way as to sober minds and calm fanaticisms, even if this means working against the grain.
I have tried to inject sobriety into the discussion. Admittedly, little has come of the effort so far. This book is among other things the history of a failure. But the simplifications of hatred and prejudice, which embitter and perpetuate the Algerian conflict, must be combated on a daily basis, and one man cannot do the job alone. What is required is a movement, a supportive press, and constant action. The lies and omissions that obscure the real problem must also be exposed on a daily basis. The government is already committed to undeclared war. It wants a free hand to deal with the problem as it sees fit while begging for money from our allies. It wants to invest in Algeria without jeopardizing the standard of living at home. It wants to be intransigent in public while negotiating in private.
It wants to cover up the mistakes of its minions while quietly disavowing them. But the parties and factions that criticize the government are hardly shining examples either. What they want is never clearly stated, or, if it is, the consequences are not drawn. Those who favor a military solution must know that the methods of total war will be required, and this will also mean reconquering Tunisia against the wishes, and perhaps the weapons, of a part of the world. This is an option, to be sure, but it must be seen and presented for what it is.
Those who advocate in deliberately vague terms negotiations with the FLN cannot be unaware that this would mean, according to the FLN’s own statements, independence for Algeria under the rule of the most uncompromising leaders of the armed insurrection, and therefore the expulsion of 1.2 million Europeans from Algeria and the humiliation of millions of French citizens, with all the risks that such humiliation implies. This, too, is no doubt an option, but one must be candid about what it would mean and stop cloaking it in euphemisms.
It would mean engaging in constant polemic, which would be counterproductive in a society in which clear thinking and intellectual independence are increasingly rare. If you write a hundred articles, all that remains of them is the distorted interpretation imposed by your adversaries. A book may not avoid every possible misunderstanding, but it at least makes certain kinds of misunderstanding impossible. You can refer to the text, and you have more space to explain crucial nuances. Because I wanted to respond to the many people who have asked me in good faith to make my position clear, I therefore decided that the best way was to sum up 20 years’ experience in this book, in the hope that those who wish to be enlightened might find something of value.
I emphasize the word “experience,” by which I mean a lengthy confrontation between a man and a situation—with all the errors, contradictions, and hesitations that such a confrontation implies, many examples of which can be found in the following pages. My opinion, moreover, is that people expect too much of writers in these matters. Even, and perhaps especially, when the writer is linked to the fate of a country like Algeria by birth and emotion, it is wrong to think that he is in possession of any revealed truth, and his personal history, were it possible to write such a history truthfully, is but a history of successive failures, of obstacles overcome only to be encountered yet again.
On this point, I am quite ready to acknowledge the inadequacies and errors of judgment that readers may detect in these pages. Nevertheless, whatever the cost to me personally, I thought it might at least be possible to collect the many pieces I have written on this subject and lay them before people whose minds are not yet made up. The psychological détente that one senses right now between French and Arabs in Algeria also raises hopes that the language of reason might once again be heard.
In this book the reader will therefore find a discussion of the economic causes of the Algerian tragedy (in connection with a very serious crisis in Kabylia), some milestones in the political evolution of the crisis, comments on the complexity of the present situation, a prediction of the impasse to which the revival and repression of terrorism have led, and, finally, a brief sketch of what seems to me a still possible solution.
Taking note of the end of colonialism, I rule out any thought of reconquest or continuation of the status quo, because these are really reactions of weakness and humiliation, which are laying the groundwork for an eventual divorce that will add to the woes of both France and Algeria. But I also rule out any thought of uprooting the French of Algeria, who do not have the right to oppress anyone but do have the right not to be oppressed themselves, as well as the right to determine their own future in the land of their birth. There are other ways to restore the justice that is indispensable than to replace one injustice by another.
I have tried to define my position clearly in this regard. An Algeria consisting of federated communities linked to France seems to me unquestionably preferable from the standpoint of justice to an Algeria linked to an Islamic empire that would subject the Arab peoples to additional misery and suffering and tear the French people of Algeria from their natural homeland. If the Algeria in which I invest my hopes still has any chance of coming into being (as I believe it does), then I want to help in any way I can. By contrast, I believe that I should not for one second or in any way help in the constitution of the other Algeria.
If, contrary to French interests or remote from France, the forces of surrender were to converge with the forces of pure conservatism to consolidate a double defeat, I would feel immense sorrow, and along with millions of other Frenchmen I would have to draw the appropriate conclusions. That is my honest opinion. I may be mistaking or misjudging a tragedy that touches me personally. But if the hopes that one can today still reasonably entertain were to vanish tomorrow in the wake of grave events affecting our country or mankind as a whole, we will all be jointly responsible, and each of us will be accountable for what he or she has said and done. This is my testimony, and I shall have nothing more to say.
March–April 1958
1. The French abbreviation for National Liberation Front, the Algerian rebel organization.—Trans.
2. In 1957, 303 Muslim inhabits of the village of Melouza, or Mechtah-Kasbah, were killed by the FLN on the grounds that they supported a rival pro-independence group, the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA).—Trans.
The Misery of Kabylia
In early 1939, Kabylia suffered a cruel famine, whose causes and effects will be explored in this and subsequent articles. I was sent to the region as a reporter for Alger républicain, a daily newspaper that at the time had a Socialist and Radical coloration, and published these articles on June 5 and 15, 1939. The pieces were too long and detailed to reproduce here in their entirety, and I have cut overly general observations and sections on housing, welfare, crafts, and usury.
1
Destitution
Before attempting a broad overview of the misery in Kabylia and retracing the itinerary of famine that I have been following for many long days now, I want to say a few words about the economic causes of this misery. They can be summed up in one sentence: Kabylia is an overpopulated region that consumes more than it produces. These mountains enfold in their creases a teeming population, which in some villages, such as Djurdjura, attain a density of 247 inhabitants per square kilometer.
No country in Europe is this crowded. The mean density in France is 71 per square kilometer. Furthermore, the Kabyle people consume mainly cereals such as wheat, barley, and sorghum in the form of flatcakes or couscous, but the Kabyle soil does not support these crops. The region’s cereal production meets only one-eighth of its consumption needs. The grain necessary for life must therefore be purchased on the open market. In a region with virtually no industry, this can be done only by supplying a surplus of complementary agricultural produce.
Kabylia is mainly a country of orchards, however. Its two main cash crops are figs and olives. In many places,
