Bondage of the Will
a mere accommodation of Malachi’s words, which have no
reference to this
subject. — Luther refines here too much, and is again guilty of arguing per sequelam [by sequel – this follows that, therefore]. The whole world is guilty. Why then, if there is any
good thing in them; any
good part in their substance, or any
good affection of their substance, it ought to be excepted: or else this part, etc. has an answer for God. But why may they not have abused this
good part? The
testimony is against their
spirit and conduct. By
inference, their whole substance and all its affections must be bad; but this is not asserted. Just so, in the last section; ‘Man does not seek after God’ is the same as saying, ‘Man cannot seek after God,’ which he proves by
argument and
inference.
[←703]
Luther misapprehends the condemnation here pronounced by the Apostle. It is not that the works of the law are evil; or that the works of men, so far as they are a fulfilment of it, are evil; but that they do not really perform these works. If they really performed these works, such testimonies as those above would not have been borne against them. The
fact that such testimonies have been borne (which he has shown to be designed especially for them) proves that they are not keepers of the law but the breakers of it; and as breakers, not as keepers, they are condemned by it. — Luther is again in error about the word ‘flesh.’ It is not sinful affection here, any
more than in the former instances: it is a name for the human
species; ‘no flesh’ is ‘no human
being.’ The
argument, however, is not shaken. If the deeds of the law are ever so
good, but man and Freewill, instead of attaining to them, are condemned by them; what is man, and what is Freewill?
[←704]
I say, to the Jews only; (see above, Sect. 2. note c , and Sect. 7. note p) though Luther would have it apply to both. Clearly, however, both did not have it in the same form; and the Jew had the ceremonial, which the
Gentile confessedly did not. It was
necessary to Luther’s
argument, therefore that he should mark the distinction. He goes on, “Nor had this been abrogated.”
[←705]
Regnant: having
power and authority.
[←706]
The cavil is this: Paul speaks of ceremonial works exclusively. Luther’s answer is, 1. Paul’s
argument would be defective. 2. Grace would be a mere trifle. 3. These works have not become deathly. 4. They were a part of the law requirements
meaning as much as the decalogue, and have never been abrogated. 5 “When treating the same
subject in Galatians 3, he expressly says, ‘All things which are written in the book of the law.’
The true and short answer to this cavil is that the whole law, ceremonial and moral, is one institution, and Paul makes no exceptions or distinctions. Luther goes wide and says many exceptionable things. What he says about ‘not abrogated,’ is ambiguous, inconclusive, and unnecessary. Does he mean that the law in both its parts is still standing, just as it was? Was it the Apostle’s place here to say ‘not abrogated,’ if he considered it so — as he does explicitly in Romans 6, 7; 2Cor 3; Eph 2; Col 2; Gal 4; and 1Tim 1? Is it true that what has been the law is not to be spoken of under the name of the law, unless it be still in force and reigning? Did the Jews, to whom this
argument is addressed — I say ‘only,’ he says ‘firstly’ (see last note) — require any
assertion of its authority? What he says to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between Paul and Moses, which forms the basis of his
interpretation and position here, he says under a misapprehension of both Paul’s and Moses’
meaning, and says unwisely and untruly. (Compare Deut 27.1-26, with Gal 3.10.) Paul does not have it for his object, to condemn as many as are doers of the law, but “as many as are of the works of the law;” that is, all those who are looking for
justification, in whole or in part, from their obedience to the law. What inconsistency is there between this interdict of Paul’s, and Moses’ curse, pronounced upon everyone who does not continue in all things? etc. — Paul neither takes away this curse, nor condemns the fulfiller. He condemns the attempt to fulfil, not because it succeeds, but because it fails, and must ever fail. — ‘They both require the
Spirit in their performer: Moses’ cursed does not continue, because he does not have the
Spirit; Paul’s cursed is not justified, because he does the works without the
Spirit.’ Now, there is no consideration about either
power or motive, in either. Moses in effect says, fulfil; without inquiring or teaching how. And Paul says, ‘aiming to be justified by the law, curses, because man cannot fulfil it, and there is a curse upon him who does not do it.’ But the
Spirit is so far from
being the law fulfiller (legis consummator), as Luther entitles him, that he who has the
Spirit, after
justification, does not “continue in all things,” and would be condemned still, if that were required of him; nor is it in any way his aim to do so. His aim is to do the whole
will of God, in that
relation into which he has now manifestly and consciously been brought by Him in Christ, as God is pleased to make known that
will to him, and to enable him, by his
Spirit which dwells and walks in him: a rule, if it can be called a rule, far
more extensive and copious than the law, and of a totally different
character; the law of an eternally saved and glorified sinner, walking in Christ with God — his Father, his Friend, his Portion, his exceeding Joy. — What he says here, and in other places, about the
justification of the
Spirit, is fallacious. His language implies that, if the obedience of those who are “of the works of the law” were yielded in the
Spirit, it would justify; and that it was for lack of this gift, that Moses’ worshippers did not escape their curse by “continuing in all things.” Now, though it is true that the
Spirit justifies the Lord’s called people (1Cor 6.11), as it “manifested God in the flesh” (1Tim 3.16), by proving whose, and who, and what they are — this is perfectly distinct from any act of obedience which removes the curse, or earns acceptance. However, all he wants from Galatians he has: ‘Paul, treating the same
subject there, expressly comprehends the whole law.’
[←707]
I object to Luther’s interpretations and conclusions in this section. He infers a division of law workers from the words no flesh; by which Paul does not express division, but universality. No flesh (see above, Part iv. Sect. 37. note k) is no human
being. The
argument drawn from this supposed division therefore — that it is the deeds of the law done without the
Spirit, which fail to justify, and do absolutely condemn — falls to the ground. In the several passages which he quotes, the opposition is not between the
Spirit and the deeds of the law, but between the Law and the Gospel. (Gal 3; Rom 3) Nor do I allow the parallel between this text and John 3.6, any further than that the word ‘flesh’ is used in the same
sense in both; but that is not Luther’s
sense. I must object to the
assertion that it is the absence of the
Spirit which makes the deeds of the law damnable, which would not be damnable, if He were present in them — as if any works of man in the flesh, performed with or without the
Spirit, could endure the severity of God’s
judgment! All I can allow to Luther in this section, therefore, is that ‘By the deeds of the law no flesh shall be justified in his sight.’ Therefore, Freewill, even with the help of the law, is still condemned; for even with that help she cannot justify. Then what is she without it? — And is this not enough?
Luther misapprehends the
scope of the Apostle’s
argument. He is not
reasoning and declaring about man as with, and as without, the
Spirit: but having shown what man is, both Jew and
Gentile, from Scripture, he is arguing how impossible it is that he should be justified by the law. The
argument is against
justification by the law, as preparatory to his opening of
justification by the Gospel; not against man’s natural impotency and imbecility, while without the
Spirit. — Luther makes ‘not justified’ to mean the same as ‘damned.’ It implies damnation, certainly; but Luther’s expressions and
argument intimate that damnation is brought and incurred by doing these deeds without the
Spirit; whereas, in
fact, that damnation had already been incurred before the law came; and it was only continued and manifested by it, instead of
being removed.
[←708]
How clearly these latter words of Paul confirm the view
given in the former note as to his
meaning and design! The law cannot justify, for it exposes this
state of man which I have been charging upon him; it just manifests what he is. He does not say makes sin, or makes him a sinner; but is, or leads to, knowledge and acknowledgment of sin. What connection would this clause have with the preceding