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Bondage of the Will
different language about Freewill. This is just what happens, as I perceive it, to all mankind: they are one sort of people while intent upon words and reasonings; and another when feeling and acting. In the former instance, they speak a language which differs from their later feelings; in the latter, their feelings contradict their previous language. But whether they are actually pious or impious, men are to be measured by their feelings, rather than their discourse.194

SECT. 5. However they may dispute about it, Luther demands a definition of Freewill; a specification of its parts, powers, properties, and accidents.

But we give you still more. We do not demand miracles, the Spirit, or sanctification. We return to the dogma itself, demanding only that you at least show us what work, what word, what thought, this power of the free will stirs up or attempts to perform, in order that it may apply itself to grace. It is not enough to say, ‘there is a power,’ ‘there is a power,’ ‘there is a certain power, I say, in the free will;’ for what is easier than to say this? Nor is this worthy of those most learned and most holy men who have been approved by so many ages. ‘The babe must be named,’ as the German proverb has it. You must define what that power is, what it does, what it allows, what are its accidents. 195

For example; speaking as one who is most dull of apprehension, I would ask, is it the office of this power either to pray, or to fast, or to labour, or to subdue the body, or to give alms, or to do anything else of this kind, or does it make any attempt at these things? If it is a power, then it will be trying to achieve something. But here, you are more silent than the Seriphian frogs, and fishes. 196

And how is it possible that you should define it when, according to your own testimony, you are still uncertain what the power itself is; being at variance with each other, and each of you inconsistent with himself? What will become of the definition when the thing defined means one thing in one place, and another in another place?
But let it be granted that, since the time of Plato, there has at length been some sort of agreement among you about the power itself. Let it further be defined, as its office, that it prays, or fasts, or does something of this sort, which still, perhaps, lies concealed in the maze of Plato’s ‘Ideas.’ 197 Who will assure us that the dogma is true, that it is well-pleasing to God, and that we are safe in maintaining it? 198 Especially, when you yourselves confess that it is a human thing, which does not have the testimony of the Spirit.

For it was bandied by the philosophers, and existed in the world before Christ came, and before the Spirit was sent from heaven. Thus it is made most certain that this dogma was not sent from heaven, but had been born long before, out of the earth — so that a great deal of testimony is necessary to confirm it as certain and true.

Let us, then, be private men and few; while you are publicans 199 and even a multitude; let us be barbarians, and you most learned; let us be stupid, and you most ingenious; let us be men of yesterday, and you older than Deucalion;200 let us be men of no acceptance; and you, men who have received the approbation of ages; let us, in fine, be sinners, carnal, and sottish; 201 and you be men fitted to excite fear in the very devils — by your sanctity, the Spirit which is in you, and your miracles. Give us, at least, the right of Turks and Jews: that of demanding a reason for your dogma, agreeable to what your great patron St. Peter 202 has commanded you.

We ask this, however, with the greatest modesty. For we do not demand that it be proved to us by sanctification, by the Spirit, and by miracles, as we might do according to your own law, which is to demand these things of others. No, we even allow you not to give us any instance of thought, word, or deed in your dogma; but to teach us the simple, naked proposition. Declare the dogma itself, at least: what you wish to be understood by it; what its form is. 203

If you will not, or cannot give us an example of it, then let us at least try to give you one. Imitate the Pope and his cardinals, at least, who say, ‘Do what we say, not according to our works,’ Even so, if you say what work that power requires to be performed by its subjects, we will apply ourselves to it, leaving you to yourselves. What! Shall we not even get this from you? The more you exceed us in numbers, the more ancient you are, the greater, the better in all respects than we — that much more disgraceful is it to you, that you are not able to prove your dogma — by the miracle of even slaying a louse, or by any small affection of the Spirit, or by any small work of holiness — to us, who are a mere nothing in your presence, and wish to learn and perform your dogma. No, you are not even able to exemplify it in a single deed or word. More than this, you are not even able to declare the very form or meaning of the dogma (such a thing as never was heard of), so that we at least, might imitate it. Delightful teachers of Freewill! What are you now, but a voice, and nothing else? Who are those now, Erasmus, that boast of the Spirit, and show nothing of it; that only speak, and suddenly expect to be believed?

Are not these admired ones of yours, the men who do all this? Though extolled to the skies, they do not even answer, and yet they make such great boasts and demands. 204
We ask it as a favour, therefore, of yourself and of your party, my Erasmus, that you would at least grant to us that, being terrified with the danger incurred by our conscience, we may be allowed to indulge our fears, or at least to defer our assent to a dogma which you yourself perceive to be nothing but an empty word, and the sound of so many syllables (to wit, ‘There is such a thing as Freewill;’ ‘there is such a thing as Freewill’), even if you had attained the summit of your object, and all your positions had been proved and allowed. Then, again, it is still uncertain, even amidst your own party, whether this word exists or not, since they are at variance one with another, and each is not agreed with himself. It is a most unfair thing — no, it is the most wretched thing imaginable — that the consciences of those whom Christ has redeemed with his own blood, should be harassed with the mere phantom of a single petty word, and that word be of doubtful existence. Yet, if we do not allow ourselves to be thus harassed, we are accused of an unheard-of pride for having despised so many Fathers, of so many ages, who have asserted the doctrine of Freewill. But the truth is, they have laid down no distinct propositions at all concerning it, as you perceive from what has been said. And the dogma of Freewill is set up under the cover of their name, while its maintainers are unable to exhibit either its species, or its name. 205 It is thus that they have contrived to delude the world with a lying word! 206

SECT. 6. Erasmus’ advice turned against himself: presumption, cruelty, and lack of discernment, are charged upon him.
And here, Erasmus, I summon your own and not another’s counsel 207 to my aid; you who persuade us above that we ought to desist from questions of this kind, and rather teach Christ crucified, and those things that may suffice for Christian piety. For a long time now, such has been the nature of our questions and discussions. For what else are we aiming at, but that the simplicity and purity of Christ’s doctrine may prevail; and that those dogmas which have been invented and introduced by men, may be abandoned and disregarded. But, while you give us this advice, you do not act it, but do just the contrary. You write Diatribes, you celebrate the decrees of Popes, you boast in the authority of men, and you try all means to hurry us into those matters which are strangers and aliens to the holy Scriptures, and to agitate on unnecessary topics, in order that we may corrupt and confound the simplicity and genuineness of Christian piety, with the additions of men.

Hence, we readily perceive that you have not given us this counsel from your heart; and that you do not write anything seriously, but trust to the vain and puerile ornaments of your language, 208 as that which may enable you to lead the world wherever you please. Meanwhile, in point of fact, you lead it nowhere; for you utter nothing but sheer contradictions throughout the whole, and in every part. So that, you would be most fitly characterised by someone who called you Proteus or Vertumnus 209 — or who accosted you with the words of Christ, and said,

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different language about Freewill. This is just what happens, as I perceive it, to all mankind: they are one sort of people while intent upon words and reasonings; and another