Unless, of course, Freewill can only be defended by arguments that mutually devour and make an end of each other (as indeed it is most worthy of her) — just as the Midianites destroyed themselves, by a mutual slaughter while making war against Gideon and the people of God.
But let me expostulate still more at large with this wise Diatribe. The Preacher does not say, ‘If you have a desire or endeavour to keep, which is nevertheless not to be ascribed to your own powers;’ — as you might collect from his words. Rather, ‘If you will keep the commandments, they will preserve you.’ Now, if we drew inferences such as you are prone to do in your wisdom, we would infer, ‘therefore, man can keep the commandments.’ And thus, we would leave in man not only a little bit of a desire, or a sort of endeavouring, but we would ascribe to him the whole fulness and abundance of power to keep the commandments. Otherwise, the Preacher would be mocking the misery of man by commanding him to keep what he knew man is unable to keep. Nor would it be enough that man have the desire and endeavour. Not even by this would the Preacher escape the suspicion of using mockery: he must intimate that man has in him a power of keeping.
But let us suppose this desire and endeavour of Freewill is something. What would we say to those Pelagians who, from this passage, were used to denying grace altogether, and who ascribed everything to Freewill? Without doubt, the Pelagians have gained the victory if Diatribe’s consequence is allowed. For the words of the Preacher import keeping, and not merely desiring or endeavouring. Now, if you deny to the Pelagians the inference of keeping, they will, in turn, much more properly deny you the inference of endeavouring. And if you take away complete Freewill from them, they will take from you that little particle of it which you say remains — not allowing you to claim for a particle, what you have denied to the whole substance.
So that, whatever you urge against the Pelagians, who ascribe a whole 320 to Freewill from this passage, will come much more forcibly from us, in contradiction to that little bit of a desire which constitutes your Freewill. 321 The Pelagians will also agree with us so far as to admit that, if their opinion cannot be proved from this passage, then much less can any other opinion be proved from it. For, if the cause is to be pleaded by inferences, then the Preacher argues most strongly of all for the Pelagians, as he speaks expressly of entire keeping. ‘If you will keep the commandments.’ Indeed, he speaks of faith also: ‘If you will keep acceptable faith,’ So that, by the same inference, we ought to have it in our power to keep faith also. However, this faith is the sole and rare gift of God, as Paul says. 322
In short, since so many opinions are enumerated in support of Freewill, and not one of them fails to seize for itself this passage from Ecclesiasticus, and since those opinions are different and contrary — it must follow that they deem 323 the Preacher contradictory and opposite, each to the other severally, in the self-same words.
They can therefore prove nothing from him. Still, if that inference is admitted, he argues for the Pelagians only, an against all the rest. And so, he argues against Diatribe, who cuts her own throat here. 324
SECT. 18. Concludes that Ecclesiasticus proves nothing for Freewill, whether what is said is understood of Adam, or of men generally.
But I renew my first assertion; viz. that this passage from Ecclesiasticus patronises none of those, absolutely, who maintain Freewill; but it opposes them all. For that inference, ‘if you will — therefore you can,’ is inadmissible. And the true understanding of such passages as these is that, by this word and the like, man is warned of his impotency which, being ignorant and proud, if it were not for these divine warnings, he would neither admit nor feel.
And here I do not speak of the first man only, but of any man, and every man; though it is of little consequence whether you understand it of the first man, or of any other man whatsoever. For although the first man was not impotent through the presence of grace, God still shows him abundantly by this precept, how impotent he would be in the absence of grace.
Now if that man, having the Spirit, 325 was not able to will good — that is, to will obedience — while his will was still new, and good was newly proposed to him, 326 because the Spirit did not add it — then what could we, who do not have the Spirit, do towards the good which we have lost? It was shown, therefore, in that first man, by a terrible example, for bruising our pride, what our Freewill can do when left to itself — yes, when urged and increased continually, more and more, by the Spirit of God. The first man could not attain to a more enlarged measure of the Spirit, of which he possessed the firstfruits, but fell from the possession of those firstfruits. How then should we, in our fallen state, have power to recover those firstfruits which have been taken from us? Especially since Satan now reigns in us with full power — who laid the first man prostrate by a mere temptation, when he had not yet reigned in him.
It would be impossible to maintain a stronger debate against Free will, than by discussing this text of Ecclesiasticus in connection with the fall of Adam. But I do not have room for such a descant here, and perhaps the matter will present itself elsewhere. Meanwhile, let it suffice to have shown that the Preacher says nothing in support of Freewill here (which its advocates, however, consider to be their principal testimony); and that this and similar passages, ‘If you will,’ ‘if you will hear,’ ‘if you will do,’ do not declare what man can do, but only what he ought to do. 327
SECT. 19. Gen. 4.7 considered.
Another passage is cited by our Diatribe from the fourth chapter of Genesis, where the Lord says to Cain, “The desire for sin shall be subject to you, and you shall rule over it.”
‘It is shown here,’ says Diatribe, ‘that the motions of the mind towards evil may be overcome, and do not induce a necessity of sinning,’
This saying, that ‘the motions of the mind towards evil may be overcome,’ is ambiguous; but the general sentiment, consequence,328 and facts, compel us to this understanding of it: that ‘it is the property of Freewill to overcome its own motions towards evil, and that those motions do not induce a necessity of sinning,’ Why is it again omitted here, ‘which is not ascribed to Free will? 329 What need is there of the Spirit, of Christ, or of God, if Freewill can overcome the motions of the mind towards evil? Again, what has become of that approvable opinion which says that Freewill cannot even will good?
Here, however, victory over evil is ascribed to this substance which neither wills nor wishes good. Our Diatribe’s carelessness is beyond all measure here. Hear the truth of the matter in a few words. I have said before, man has it shown to him by such expressions as these, not what he can do, but what he ought to do. Cain is told, therefore, that he ought to rule over sin, and to keep its lustings in subjection to himself. But he neither did nor could do this, seeing that he was now pressed to the earth by the foreign 330 yoke of Satan. It is notorious that the Hebrews frequently use the future indicative for the imperative: as in the twentieth chapter of Exodus; ‘You shall not have any other Gods,’ ‘You shall not kill,’ ‘You shall not commit adultery,’ and countless similar instances. On the contrary, if the words are taken indicatively, according to their literal meaning, 331 they would become so many promises of God, who cannot lie; and thus, nobody would commit sin, and there would be no need, therefore, of these precepts. In fact, our translator would
