SECT. 43. Objections from Paul summarily dispatched.
After this we come to Paul also, the most determined enemy to Freewill, who is nevertheless compelled to establish Freewill by what he says in Rom 2.4, “Or do you despise the riches of his goodness and patience and longsuffering? Or do you not know that his goodness leads you to repentance?” How can contempt for the commandment be imputed, where the will is not free? How can God invite us to repentance, when he is the author of impenitence? How can it be that damnation is just, when the judge constrains us to the crime? 437
I answer, let Diatribe look to these questions, for what are they to me? She has told us in her approvable opinion, that Freewill cannot will good, which compels us necessarily into the service of sin. How is it, indeed, that contempt of the commandment is imputed to her if she cannot will good, and if she has no liberty, but is under necessary bondage to sin? How is it that God invites us to repentance, when he is the author of man’s impenitence — in that God deserts him or does not confer grace upon him, when man cannot will good if left alone? How is it that the damnation is just when the judge, by withdrawing his help, makes it unavoidable that the ungodly man is left to do wickedly, since he can do nothing else by his own power?
All these sayings recoil on the head of Diatribe; or if they prove anything, they prove (what I have said) that Freewill can do everything, in contradiction to what she has said herself, and everybody else. These consequences of reason annoy 438 Diatribe throughout all her Scripture quotations. Is it not truly ridiculous and meaningless, to attack and exact 439 in such vehement language, if there is not one present who can fulfil the demand? All the while, the Apostle has for his object, to lead ungodly and proud men to the knowledge of themselves, and of their own impotency, by means of these threatenings, so that having humbled them by the knowledge of sin, he may prepare them for grace. 440
SECT. 44. Wickliff’s confession is confessed.
And why do I need to recount, one by one, all the texts which are adduced from Paul’s writings, when she but collects a number of imperative or conjunctive verbs, or those expressions which Paul confessed for use in exhorting Christians to the fruits of faith? 441 Because, by adding her own consequences, Diatribe imagines 442 a Freewill of such and so great a virtue that, without grace, it can do everything which Paul the exhorter prescribes. Christians, however, are not led by Freewill, but by the Spirit of God. (Rom 8.14.) Now, to be led is not to lead ourselves, but to be driven along, just as the saw or the hatchet 443 is driven along by the carpenter.
And here, lest anyone doubt that Luther said such “absurd” things, Diatribe recites Wickliff’s words, which I deliberately own, avowing his article 444 as I do: that ‘all things are done by necessity;’ that is, by the unchangeable will of God; ‘and our will, though not indeed compelled to do evil, is incapable of doing any good by its own power’. 445
He was falsely condemned by the Council of Constance 446 (or rather by conspiracy and sedition). Indeed, even Diatribe herself defends him in conjunction with me, asserting as she does, that Freewill can will nothing good by its own powers, and that it serves sin necessarily — though, in the course of her proof, she establishes the direct contrary.
PART IV. LUTHER DEFENDS CERTAIN TESTIMONIES AGAINST FREEWILL.
SECTION 1. Erasmus has but two Texts to kill.
LET what has been said suffice in answer to Diatribe’s first part, in which she endeavours to establish the reality of Freewill; and let us now consider her second part, in which she seeks to confute the testimonies on our side of the question: those, I mean, by which its existence is negatived. You will see here what a man-raised smoke is, when it is opposed to God’s thunders and lightnings!
First then, after having recited innumerable texts of Scripture in support of Freewill, as a sort of army too dreadful to encounter (so that she may give courage to the confessors and martyrs, and all the holy men and women who stand up for Freewill; and may inspire fear and trembling in all who are guilty of the sin of denying it); she pretends that the host which comes to oppose Freewill is contemptible in number, and goes on to represent that there are but two passages which stand conspicuous above the rest on this side of the argument. She has nothing in her mind but slaughter, it would seem, and making sure to accomplish it without much trouble. One of these is from Exo 9.12, “The Lord hardened Pharaoh’s heart:” the other is from Mal 1.2-3, “Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.”
Strange, what an odious and unprofitable discussion Paul took up, in Diatribe’s judgment, when he expounded both of these at large to the Romans! In short, if the Holy Ghost were not a little knowing in rhetoric, there would be danger lest Paul’s heart melt within him through this great reach of art, proclaiming such vast contempt for Freewill; and lest, absolutely despairing of his cause, he yielded the palm to Freewill before the trumpet had yet called the champions into the fray. Shortly, however, I will come up as the reserve 447 to these two Scriptures, and show my forces also. Yet, where the fortune of the battle is such that one man puts ten thousand to flight, Jos 23.10 what need is there of forces? If one text of Scripture has conquered Freewill, her innumerable forces will be of no use to her.
SECT. 2. Kills opposing texts by resolving them into tropes, which he defends by Luther’s example.
Here, therefore, Diatribe has discovered a new method of eluding the plainest texts, by choosing to understand the simplest and clearest forms of speech, as tropes. In the former instance, when pleading for Freewill, she eluded 448 the force of all the imperative and conjunctive law words by example, adding inferences, and superadding similes of her own invention. 449
So now, on setting out to plead against us, she turns and twists all words of divine promise and affirmation whichever way she pleases, by discovering a trope in them: so that Proteus may be inapprehensible on both sides alike. 450 Indeed, she demands this for herself with great superciliousness 451 at our hands; because we also, she pretends, are prone to make our escape from the pursuer when hard-pressed, 452 by discovering tropes.
In that phrase, for instance, ‘Stretch out your hand to whichever you will; that is, ‘grace will stretch out your hand to whichever she wills.’ ‘Make yourself a new heart;’ Eze 18.31 that is, ‘grace will make you a new heart,’ and the like. 453 It seems a great shame then, if Luther has leave to introduce so violent and forced an interpretation; but we may not so much as be allowed to follow the interpretations of the most approved doctors.
You see then, that our dispute here is not about the text as it is in itself; 454 nor is it, as in former instances, about inferences and similes — but about tropes and interpretations.
‘O when will it be,’ as some say, ‘that we get a plain and pure text, 455 without inferences and tropes, for and against Freewill? Has Scripture no such texts? And will the cause of Freewill be forever an undecided one — one that is not settled by any sure text, but driven like a reed by the winds — because nothing is brought forwards in debating it, except a number of tropes and inferences, produced by men mutually quarrelling with each other?’
SECT. 3. Trope and consequence, when they are to be admitted.
Let us rather judge that neither inference nor trope should be admitted into any passage of Scripture, unless an evident context, 456 and some absurdity which, in its plain meaning, offends against one of the articles of our faith, 457 constrain us to such an interpretation and inference. On the contrary, we should everywhere stick close to that simple, pure, and natural sense of words, which both the art of grammar, and the common use of speech as God created it in man, direct us to. 458 For if any man may, at his pleasure, invent inferences and tropes for Scripture, what will all of Scripture be, but a reed shaken by the winds, or a sort of Vertumnus? 459 Then it will indeed be true that nothing certain can be affirmed or proved, touching any article of faith, since you may quibble it away by some pretended trope. 460 Rather, let every trope be avoided, as the most destructive poison, which Scripture herself does not compel us to receive.
See what has befallen that great trope-master Origen 461
