evolutionary epistemology

evolutionary epistemology a theory of knowledge inspired by and derived from the fact and processes of organic evolution (the term was coined by the social psychologist Donald Campbell). Most evolutionary epistemologists subscribe to the theory of evolution through natural selection, as presented by Darwin in the Origin of Species (1859). However, one does find variants, especially one based on some kind of neo- Lamarckism, where the inheritance of acquired characters is central (Spencer endorsed this view) and another based on some kind of jerky or ‘saltationary’ evolutionism (Thomas Kuhn, at the end of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, accepts this idea). There are two approaches to evolutionary epistemology. First, one can think of the transformation of organisms and the processes driving such change as an analogy for the growth of knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. ‘Darwin’s bulldog,’ T. H. Huxley, was one of the first to propose this idea. He argued that just as between organisms we have a struggle for existence, leading to the selection of the fittest, so between scientific ideas we have a struggle leading to a selection of the fittest. Notable exponents of this view today include Stephen Toulmin, who has worked through the analogy in some detail, and David Hull, who brings a sensitive sociological perspective to bear on the position. Karl Popper identifies with this form of evolutionary epistemology, arguing that the selection of ideas is his view of science as bold conjecture and rigorous attempt at refutation by another name. The problem with this analogical type of evolutionary epistemology lies in the disanalogy between the raw variants of biology (mutations), which are random, and the raw variants of science (new hypotheses), which are very rarely random. This difference probably accounts for the fact that whereas Darwinian evolution is not genuinely progressive, science is (or seems to be) the paradigm of a progressive enterprise. Because of this problem, a second set of epistemologists inspired by evolution insist that one must take the biology literally. This group, which includes Darwin, who speculated in this way even in his earliest notebooks, claims that evolution predisposes us to think in certain fixed adaptive patterns. The laws of logic, e.g., as well as mathematics and the methodological dictates of science, have their foundations in the fact that those of our would-be ancestors who took them seriously survived and reproduced, and those that did not did not. No one claims that we have innate knowledge of the kind demolished by Locke. Rather, our thinking is channeled in certain directions by our biology. In an update of the biogenetic law, therefore, one might say that whereas a claim like 5 ! 7 % 12 is phylogenetically a posteriori, it is ontogenetically a priori. A major division in this school is between the continental evolutionists, most notably the late Konrad Lorenz, and the Anglo-Saxon supporters, e.g. Michael Ruse. The former think that their evolutionary epistemology simply updates the critical philosophy of Kant, and that biology both explains the necessity of the synthetic a priori and makes reasonable belief in the thing-in-itself. The latter deny that one can ever get that necessity, certainly not from biology, or that evolution makes reasonable a belief in an objectively real world, independent of our knowing. Historically, these epistemologists look to Hume and in some respects to the American pragmatists, especially William James. Today, they acknowledge a strong family resemblance to such naturalized epistemologists as Quine, who has endorsed a kind of evolutionary epistemology. Critics of this position, e.g. Philip Kitcher, usually strike at what they see as the soft scientific underbelly. They argue that the belief that the mind is constructed according to various innate adaptive channels is without warrant. It is but one more manifestation of today’s Darwinians illicitly seeing adaptation everywhere. It is better and more reasonable to think knowledge is rooted in culture, if it is person-dependent at all. A mark of a good philosophy, like a good science, is that it opens up new avenues for research. Although evolutionary epistemology is not favored by conventional philosophers, who sneer at the crudities of its (frequently nonphilosophically trained) proselytizers, its supporters feel convinced that they are contributing to a forward-moving philosophical research program. As evolutionists, they are used to things taking time to succeed. See also DARWINISM, EPISTEMOLOGY , PHI- LOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY , SOCIAL BIOLOG.
M.Ru.

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