Fichte Johann Gottlieb (1762–1814), German philosopher. He was a proponent of an uncompromising system of transcendental idealism, the Wissenschaftslehre, which played a key role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy. Born in Saxony, Fichte studied at Jena and Leipzig. The writings of Kant led him to abandon metaphysical determinism and to embrace transcendental idealism as ‘the first system of human freedom.’ His first book, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (‘Attempt at a Critique of all Revelations,’ 1792), earned him a reputation as a brilliant exponent of Kantianism, while his early political writings secured him a reputation as a Jacobin. Inspired by Reinhold, Jacobi, Maimon, and Schulze, Fichte rejected the ‘letter’ of Kantianism and, in the lectures and writings he produced at Jena (1794–99), advanced a new, rigorously systematic presentation of what he took to be its ‘spirit.’ He dispensed with Kant’s things-inthemselves, the original duality of faculties, and the distinction between the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic. By emphasizing the unity of theoretical and practical reason in a way consistent with ‘the primacy of practical reason,’ Fichte sought to establish the unity of the critical philosophy as well as of human experience.
In Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre (‘On the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre,’ 1794) he explained his conception of philosophy as ‘the science of science,’ to be presented in a deductive system based on a self-evident first principle. The basic ‘foundations’ of this system, which Fichte called Wissenschaftslehre (theory of science), were outlined in his Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (‘Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre,’ 1794–95) and Grundriß der Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen (‘Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty,’ 1795) and then, substantially revised, in his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (1796–99).
The ‘foundational’ portion of the Wissenschaftslehre links our affirmation of freedom to our experience of natural necessity. Beginning with the former (‘the I simply posits itself’), it then demonstrates how a freely self-positing subject must be conscious not only of itself, but also of ‘representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity’ and hence of an objective world. Fichte insisted that the essence of selfhood lies in an active positing of its own self-identity and hence that self-consciousness is an auto-productive activity: a Tathandlung or ‘fact/act.’ However, the I can posit itself only as limited; in order for the originally posited act of ‘sheer self-positing’ to occur, certain other mental acts must occur as well, acts through which the I posits for itself an objective, spatiotemporal world, as well as a moral realm of free, rational beings. The I first posits its own limited condition in the form of ‘feeling’ (occasioned by an inexplicable Anstob or ‘check’ upon its own practical striving), then as a ‘sensation,’ then as an ‘intuition’ of a thing, and finally as a ‘concept.’ The distinction between the I and the not-I arises only in these reiterated acts of self-positing, a complete description of which thus amounts to a ‘genetic deduction’ of the necessary conditions of experience. Freedom is thereby shown to be possible only in the context of natural necessity, where it is limited and finite. At the same time ‘our freedom is a theoretical determining principle of our world.’ Though it must posit its freedom ‘absolutely’ – i.e., schlechthin or ‘for no reason’ – a genuinely free agent can exist only as a finite individual endlessly striving to overcome its own limits. After establishing its ‘foundations,’ Fichte extended his Wissenschaftslehre into social and political philosophy and ethics. Subjectivity itself is essentially intersubjective, inasmuch as one can be empirically conscious of oneself only as one individual among many and must thus posit the freedom of others in order to posit one’s own freedom. But for this to occur, the freedom of each individual must be limited; indeed, ‘the concept of right or justice (Recht) is nothing other than the concept of the coexistence of the freedom of several rational/sensuous beings.’ The Grundlage des Naturrechts (‘Foundations of Natural Right,’ 1796–97) examines how individual freedom must be externally limited if a community of free individuals is to be possible, and demonstrates that a just political order is a demand of reason itself, since ‘the concept of justice or right is a condition of self-consciousness.’ ‘Natural rights’ are thus entirely independent of moral duties. Unlike political philosophy, which purely concerns the public realm, ethics, which is the subject of Das System der Sittenlehre (‘The System of Ethical Theory,’ 1798), concerns the inner realm of conscience. It views objects not as given to consciousness but as produced by free action, and concerns not what is, but what ought to be. The task of ethics is to indicate the particular duties that follow from the general obligation to determine oneself freely (the categorical imperative). Before Fichte could extend the Wissenschaftslehre into the philosophy of religion, he was accused of atheism and forced to leave Jena. The celebrated controversy over his alleged atheism (the Atheismusstreit) was provoked by ‘Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens in einer göttliche Weltregierung’ (‘On the Basis of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World,’ 1798), in which he sharply distinguished between philosophical and religious questions. While defending our right to posit a ‘moral world order,’ Fichte insisted that this order does not require a personal deity or ‘moral lawgiver.’ After moving to Berlin, Fichte’s first concern was to rebut the charge of atheism and to reply to the indictment of philosophy as ‘nihilism’ advanced in Jacobi’s Open Letter to Fichte (1799). This was the task of Die Bestimmung des Menschen (‘The Vocation of Man,’ 1800). During the French occupation, he delivered Reden an die deutsche Nation (‘Addresses to the German Nation,’ 1808), which proposed a program of national education and attempted to kindle German patriotism. The other publications of his Berlin years include a foray into political economy, Der geschlossene Handelstaat (‘The Closed Commercial State,’ 1800); a speculative interpretation of human history, Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtiges Zeitalters (‘The Characteristics of the Present Age,’ 1806); and a mystically tinged treatise on salvation, Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben (‘Guide to the Blessed Life,’ 1806). In unpublished private lectures he continued to develop radically new versions of the Wissenschaftslehre.
Fichte’s substantial influence was not limited to his well-known influence on Schelling and Hegel (both of whom criticized the ‘subjectivism’ of the early Wissenschaftslehre). He is also important in the history of German nationalism and profoundly influenced the early Romantics, especially Novalis and Schlegel. Recent decades have seen renewed interest in Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, expecially the later, unpublished versions of the Wissenschaftslehre. This century’s most significant contribution to Fichte studies, however, is the ongoing publication of the first critical edition of his complete works.
See also HEGEL, IDEALISM, KANT. D.Br.