methodological conservatism See PHILOSOPHY OF. SCIENC. methodological holism, also called metaphysical holism, the thesis that with respect to some system there is explanatory emergence, i.e., the laws of the more complex situations in the system are not deducible by way of any composition laws or laws of coexistence from the laws of the simpler or simplest situation(s). Explanatory emergence may exist in a system for any of the following reasons: that at some more complex level a variable interacts that does not do so at simpler levels, that a property of the ‘whole’ interacts with properties of the ‘parts,’ that the relevant variables interact by different laws at more complex levels owing to the complexity of the levels, or (the limiting case) that strict lawfulness breaks down at some more complex level. Thus, explanatory emergence does not presuppose descriptive emergence, the thesis that there are properties of ‘wholes’ (or more complex situations) that cannot be defined through the properties of the ‘parts’ (or simpler situations). The opposite of methodological holism is methodological individualism, also called explanatory reductionism, according to which all laws of the ‘whole’ (or more complex situations) can be deduced from a combination of the laws of the simpler or simplest situation(s) and either some composition laws or laws of coexistence (depending on whether or not there is descriptive emergence). Methodological individualists need not deny that there may be significant lawful connections among properties of the ‘whole,’ but must insist that all such properties are either definable through, or connected by laws of coexistence with, properties of the ‘parts.’ See also HOLISM, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES , REDUCTIO. L.A.