Ross W(illiam) D(avid) (1877–1971), British Aristotelian scholar and moral philosopher. Born in Edinburgh and educated at the University of Edinburgh and at Balliol College, Oxford, he became a fellow of Merton College, then a fellow, tutor, and eventually provost at Oriel College. He was vice-chancellor of Oxford University (1941–44) and president of the British Academy (1936–40). He was knighted in 1938 in view of national service. Ross was a distinguished classical scholar: he edited the Oxford translations of Aristotle (1908–31) and translated the Metaphysics and the Ethics himself. His Aristotle (1923) is a judicious exposition of Aristotle’s work as a whole. Kant’s Ethical Theory (1954) is a commentary on Kant’s The Groundwork of Ethics. His major contribution to philosophy was in ethics: The Right and the Good (1930) and Foundations of Ethics (1939). The view he expressed there was controversial in English-speaking countries for ten years or so. He held that ‘right’ and ‘good’ are empirically indefinable terms that name objective properties the presence of which is known intuitively by persons who are mature and educated. We first cognize them in particular instances, then arrive at general principles involving them by ‘intuitive induction.’ (He thought every ethical theory must admit at least one intuition.) The knowledge of moral principles is thus rather like knowledge of the principles of geometry. ‘Right’ (‘dutiful’) applies to acts, in the sense of what an agent brings about (and there is no duty to act from a good motive, and a right act can have a bad motive); ‘morally good’ applies primarily to the desires that bring about action. He castigated utilitarianism as absorbing all duties into enhancing the wellbeing of everyone affected, whereas in fact we have strong special obligations to keep promises, make reparation for injuries, repay services done, distribute happiness in accord with merit, benefit individuals generally (and he concedes this is a weighty matter) and ourselves (only in respect of knowledge and virtue), and not injure others (normally a stronger obligation than that to benefit). That we have these ‘prima facie’ duties is self-evident, but they are only prima facie in the sense that they are actual duties only if there is no stronger conflicting prima facie duty; and when prima facie duties conflict, what one ought to do is what satisfies all of them best – although which this is is a matter of judgment, not self-evidence. (He conceded, however, in contrast to his general critique of utilitarianism, that public support of these prima facie principles with their intuitive strength can be justified on utilitarian grounds.) To meet various counterexamples Ross introduced complications, such as that a promise is not binding if discharge of it will not benefit the promisee (providing this was an implicit understanding), and it is less binding if made long ago or in a casual manner.
Only four states of affairs are good in themselves: desire to do one’s duty (virtue), knowledge, pleasure, and the distribution of happiness in accordance with desert. Of these, virtue is more valuable than any amount of knowledge or pleasure. In Foundations of Ethics he held that virtue and pleasure are not good in the same sense: virtue is ‘admirable’ but pleasure only a ‘worthy object of satisfaction’ (so ‘good’ does not name just one property).
See also DUTY, ETHICS, MORAL EPISTEMOL — OGY, SELF — EVIDENC. R.B.B.