self-presenting in the philosophy of Meinong, having the ability – common to all mental states – to be immediately present to our thought. In Meinong’s view, no mental state can be presented to our thought in any other way – e.g., indirectly, via a Lockean ‘idea of reflection.’ The only way to apprehend a mental state is to experience or ‘live through’ it. The experience involved in the apprehension of an external object has thus a double presentational function: (1) via its ‘content’ it presents the object to our thought; (2) as its own ‘quasi-content’ it presents itself immediately to our thought. In the contemporary era, Roderick Chisholm has based his account of empirical knowledge in part on a related concept of the self-presenting. (In Chisholm’s sense – the definition of which we omit here – all self-presenting states are mental, but not conversely; for instance, being depressed because of the death of one’s spouse would not be self-presenting.) In Chisholm’s epistemology, self-presenting states are a source of certainty in the following way: if F is a self-presenting state, then to be certain that one is in state F it is sufficient that one is, and believes oneself to be in state F. See also BRENTANO , MEINONG , PHILOSOPHY OF MIN. R.Ke.