subdoxastic pertaining to states of mind postulated to account for the production and character of certain apparently non-inferential beliefs. These were first discussed by Stephen P. Stich in ‘Beliefs and Subdoxastic States’ (1978). I may form the belief that you are depressed, e.g., on the basis of subtle cues that I am unable to articulate. The psychological mechanism responsible for this belief might be thought to harbor information concerning these cues subdoxastically. Although subdoxastic states resemble beliefs in certain respects – they incorporate intentional content, they guide behavior, they can bestow justification on beliefs – they differ from fullyfledged doxastic states or beliefs in at least two respects. First, as noted above, subdoxastic states may be largely inaccessible to introspection; I may be unable to describe, even on reflection, the basis of my belief that you are depressed. Second, subdoxastic states seem cut off inferentially from an agent’s corpus of beliefs; my subdoxastic appreciation that your forehead is creased may contribute to my believing that you are depressed, but, unlike the belief that your forehead is creased, it need not, in the presence of other beliefs, lead to further beliefs about your visage. See also BELIEF. J.F.H.