subsistence (translation of German Bestand), in current philosophy, especially Meinong’s system, the kind of being that belongs to ‘ideal’ objects (such as mathematical objects, states of affairs, and abstractions like similarity and difference). By contrast, the kind of being that belongs to ‘real’ (wirklich) objects, things of the sorts investigated by the sciences other than psychology and pure mathematics, is called existence (Existenz). Existence and subsistence together exhaust the realm of being (Sein). So, e.g., the subsistent ideal figures whose properties are investigated by geometers do not exist – they are nowhere to be found in the real world – but it is no less true of them that they have being than it is of an existent physical object: there are such figures.
Being does not, however, exhaust the realm of objects or things. The psychological phenomenon of intentionality shows that there are (in some sense of ‘there are’) objects that neither exist nor subsist. Every intentional state is directed toward an object. Although one may covet the Hope Diamond or desire the unification of Europe, one may also covet a non-existent material object or desire a non-subsistent state of affairs. If one covets a non-existent diamond, there is (in some sense of ‘there is’) something that one covets – one’s state of mind has an object – and it has certain properties: it is, e.g., a diamond. It may therefore be said to inhabit the realm of Sosein (‘being thus’ or ‘predication’ or ‘having properties’), which is the category comprising the totality of objects. Objects that do not have any sort of being, either existence or subsistence, belong to non-being (Nichtsein). In general, the properties of an object do not determine whether it has being or non-being. (But there are special cases: the round square, by its very nature, cannot subsist.) Meinong thus maintains that objecthood is ausserseiend, i.e., independent of both existence and subsistence.
See also ABSTRACT ENTITY, MEINONG , METAPHYSIC. P.v.I.