Dworkin Ronald M. (b.1931), American jurist, political philosopher, and a central contributor to recent legal and political theory. He has served as professor of jurisprudence, University of Oxford (1969–98), professor of law, New York University (1975–), and Quain Professor of Jurisprudence, University College, London (1998–). He was the first significant critic of Hart’s positivist analysis of law as based on a determinable set of social rules. Dworkin argues that the law contains legal principles as well as legal rules. Legal principles are standards phrased generally (e.g., ‘No one shall profit from his own wrong’); they do not have a formal ‘pedigree,’ but are requirements of morality. Nonetheless, courts are obliged to apply such principles, and thus have no lawmaking discretion. Judicially enforceable legal rights must derive from antecedent political rights. Dworkin characterizes rights as political ‘trumps’ – hence his title Taking Rights Seriously (2d ed., 1978), which collects the papers that defend the views sketched. Dworkin postulates an idealized judge, Hercules, who can invariably determine what rights are legally enforceable. Dworkin denies any metaphysical commitments thereby, and emphasizes instead the constructive and interpretive nature of both adjudication and legal theory. These arguments are made in papers collected in A Matter of Principle (1985). Law’s Empire (1986) systematizes his view. He presents there a theory of ‘law as integrity.’ The court’s obligation is to make the community’s law the best it can be by finding decisions that best fit both institutional history and moral principle. Hercules always best determines the best fit.
Dworkin has also contributed to substantive political theory. He defends a form of liberalism that makes equality as prominent as liberty. His account of equality is found in a number of independent papers; see, e.g., ‘Foundations of Liberal Equality,’ Tanner Lectures on Human Values XI (1990). Dworkin has applied his liberal theory in two ways. He has continually acted as a critical watchdog of the U.S. Supreme Court, assessing decisions for their adherence to the ideals of principle, respect for equality, and achievement of best fit. Some of these essays are in the two collections mentioned; the most recent are in Freedom’s Law (1996). Life’s Dominion (1993) derives from these ideals an account of abortion and euthanasia.
Dworkin’s philosophizing has a conceptual richness and rhetorical fire that, when not wholly under control, give his theoretical positions a protean quality at the level of detail. Nonetheless, the ideas that adjudication should be principled and enforce rights, and that we all deserve equal dignity and respect, exercise a powerful fascination.
See also EUTHANASIA , HART, JURISPRU – DENCE , LEGAL POSITIVISM , MORAL STATUS , NATURAL LAW, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, RIGHT. R.A.Sh.
