motivation a property central in al explanations of intentional conduct. To assert that Ann is driving to Boston today because she wants to see the Red Sox play and believes that they are playing today in Boston is to offer a motivational explanation of this action. On a popular interpretation, the assertion mentions a pair of attitudes: a desire and a belief. Ann’s desire is a paradigmatic motivational attitude in that it inclines her to bring about the satisfaction of that very attitude. The primary function of motivational attitudes is to bring about their own satisfaction by inducing the agent to undertake a suitable course of action, and, arguably, any attitude that has that function is, ipso facto, a motivational one. The related thesis that only attitudes having this function are motivational – or, more precisely, motivation-constituting – is implausible. Ann hopes that the Sox won yesterday. Plainly, her hope cannot bring about its own satisfaction, since Ann has no control over the past. Even so, the hope seemingly may motivate action (e.g., Ann’s searching for sports news on her car radio), in which case the hope is motivation-constituting. Some philosophers have claimed that our beliefs that we are morally required to take a particular course of action are motivation-constituting, and such beliefs obviously do not have the function of bringing about their own satisfaction (i.e., their truth). However, the claim is controversial, as is the related claim that beliefs of this kind are ‘besires’ – that is, not merely beliefs but desires as well. See also ACCIDIE , ACTION THEORY, MOTIVATIONAL EXPLANATION , MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALIS.
A.R.M.