scientific realism the view that the subject matter of scientific research and scientific theories exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that the goal of science is the description and explanation of both observable and unobservable aspects of the world. Scientific realism is contrasted with logical empiricism and social constructivism. Early arguments for scientific realism simply stated that, in light of the impressive products and methods of science, realism is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle. Formulations of scientific realism focus on the objects of theoretical knowledge: theories, laws, and entities. One especially robust argument for scientific realism (due to Putnam and Richard Boyd) is that the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology in the mature sciences (such as physics, chemistry, and some areas of biology) can be explained adequately only if we suppose that theories in the mature sciences are at least approximately true and their central theoretical terms are at least partially referential (Putnam no longer holds this view). More timid versions of scientific realism do not infer approximate truth of mature theories. For example, Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’ (1983) asserts that the instrumental manipulation of postulated entities to produce further effects gives us legitimate grounds for ontological commitment to theoretical entities, but not to laws or theories. Paul Humphreys’s ‘austere realism’ (1989) states that only theoretical commitment to unobserved structures or dispositions could explain the stability of observed outcomes of scientific inquiry. Distinctive versions of scientific realism can be found in works by Richard Boyd (1983), Philip Kitcher (1993), Richard Miller (1987), William Newton-Smith (1981), and J. D. Trout (1998). Despite their differences, all of these versions of realism are distinguished – against logical empiricism – by their commitment that knowledge of unobservable phenomena is not only possible but actual. As well, all of the arguments for scientific realism are abductive; they argue that either the approximate truth of background theories or the existence of theoretical entities and laws provides the best explanation for some significant fact about the scientific theory or practice.
Scientific realists address the difference between real entities and merely useful constructs, arguing that realism offers a better explanation for the success of science. In addition, scientific realism recruits evidence from the history and practice of science, and offers explanations for the success of science that are designed to honor the dynamic and uneven character of that evidence. Most arguments for scientific realism cohabit with versions of naturalism. Anti-realist opponents argue that the realist move from instrumental reliability to truth is question-begging. However, realists reply that such formal criticisms are irrelevant; the structure of explanationist arguments is inductive and their principles are a posteriori.
See also EXPLANATION, METAPHYSICS , PHI- LOSOPHY OF SCIENCE , SOCIAL CONSTRUC — TIVIS. J.D.T.